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ABSTRACT 
Territorial disputes—often fueled by ethnic animosity or competition for scarce 
resources—are often catalysts for conflicts that can lead to war. To reduce the 
prospect of conflict, and larger-scale war, peaceful and enduring resolutions to 
territorial problems are desirable. The process of conflict resolution should 
provide parties with a lasting, mutually agreeable outcome. Prospect theory has 
the potential to determine the types of territorial disputes that may be candidates 
for an arbitrated resolution. Nash arbitration may provide an optimal solution to 
both parties, forestalling conflict escalation. This thesis examines how prospect 
theory and Nash arbitration are applicable, acceptable, and durable, by 
operationalizing a non-violent approach to territorial dispute resolution. 
Specifically, prospect theory is integrated into game theory, and Nash arbitration 
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Territorial control is a historical and widespread cause for war, with 
conflicting claims often cited as precursors to conflict.1  Specifically, border 
disputes—often fueled by ethnic animosity or resource competition—are often 
catalysts for territorial conflicts that can lead to war.2  For centuries, maps have 
been used to assert territorial claims, or to settle them.3  While control over 
territory is cartographically a zero-sum game, this view is perhaps too narrow.4  
Exploitation of natural resources is an example where a territorial dispute can be 
considered a partial-sum game; both sides can benefit if the costs of conflict are 
removed, or both sides can be handicapped by discord. 
To mitigate the risk of conflict, and thus larger-scale war, peaceful and 
enduring resolutions to territorial disputes are desirable. The process should 
provide all parties with a lasting, mutually agreeable outcome. Prospect theory, 
                                            
1 Refer to: Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1999); Michael Klare, Resource Wars (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2001); Paul Diehl and 
Gary Goertz, “Territorial Changes and Militarized Conflict,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 32 
no. 1 (1988); Paul Senese and John Vasquez, “Assessing the Steps to War,” British Journal of 
Political Science 35 no. 4 (2005); William Reed and Diana Chiba, “Decomposing the Relationship 
between Contiguity and Militarized Conflict,” American Journal of Political Science 54 no. 1 
(2010). 
2 Van Evera argues that war is more likely when resources are cumulative.  Disputes 
based on additive resources (that can be readily used to seize more resources) require states to 
complete more fiercely.  Klare highlights that the protection of resources governs state’s strategic 
planning.  With the increasing global demand for dwindling resources, disputes over conflicting 
claims become more acute.  He notes other sources of conflict (ethnic hostility, economic 
injustice, political competition, etc.) will increasingly be linked to disputes over vital materials.  
Diehl and Goertz conclude the more important a territory in terms of area, the more likely violent 
conflict will result if control over the area is transferred.  Senese and Vasquez find the probability 
of war breaking out between two states is higher for states disputing territory than for those 
disputing policy or regime questions. 
3 See, Jeremy Black, Maps and Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).  
Specifically, chapters 1, 5, and 6. 
4 Moving beyond a material view of terrain, Tuomas Forsberg argues for analyzing 
disputes with a normative view, stating, “political, social and psychological perspectives of 
territories and borders are more accurate than a simple geo-graphical one.”  Tuomas Forsberg, 
“Explaining Territorial Disputes: From Power Politics to Normative Reasons,” Journal of Peace 
Research 33 no. 4 (1996): 438. 
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by comparing the risk of losses from a defined reference point to conceivable 
gains, has the potential to determine types of territorial disputes that may be 
candidates for an arbitrated resolution. With the most arbitrable disputes 
identified, Nash arbitration may provide an optimal solution to both parties, 
forestalling conflict escalation. 
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE  
This thesis examines whether and how prospect theory and Nash 
arbitration are applicable, acceptable, and durable for territorial dispute 
resolution. Resolved and ongoing dyadic border disputes from 1816 to present 
are considered for analysis. Other types of territorial disputes (e.g., disputes over 
dependent or colonial properties) are not considered. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Understanding that prospect theory and Nash arbitration may have utility 
in territorial dispute resolution, the following research questions are investigated:  
1. Under what conditions are territorial disputes most arbitrable? 
2. How can Nash arbitration be operationalized to resolve territorial 
disputes? 
 
D. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This thesis intends to operationalize a non-violent approach to territorial 
dispute resolution: arbitration. Prospect theory may have utility in determining the 
arbitrability of territorial dispute cases. As “a leading alternative to expected utility 
as a theory of choice under conditions of risk,”5 prospect theory assigns values to 
gains and losses from a reference point, rather than valuing final assets.6  As 
Kahneman and Tversky state, “A salient characteristic of attitudes to changes in 
welfare is that losses loom larger than gains.”7  This attitude affects how states 
                                            
5 Jack S. Levy, “Loss Aversion, Framing, and Bargaining: The Implications of Prospect 
Theory for International Conflict,” International Political Science Review 17 no. 2 (1996): 179. 
6 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under 
Risk,” Econometrica 47 no. 2 (1979): 263. 
7 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 279. 
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view dispute resolution options, either from a gains frame or from a losses frame. 
Moving from a domain of gains to domain of losses, or vice versa, causes a flip in 
preferences that violates the principle of invariance under expected utility. It also 
explains why leaders do not maximize their choices, overweigh losses with 
respect to comparable gains, are risk averse when given choices between gains, 
and are risk acceptant when facing losses.8  Therefore, how the conflict is framed 
is a key component to determining the applicability of arbitration. Specifically, 
how prospects (e.g., access to resources, control of territory) are combined, 
segregated, or cancelled during decision making.9  
While prospect theory may help determine applicability, Nash arbitration 
can determine the acceptability and durability of dispute solutions by providing a 
reasonable and fair outcome. Nash arbitration provides a solution point N that 
incorporates the utilities of each party, while also integrating their strategic 
position regarding the dispute. Nash solutions are Pareto optimal, and at or 
above the security level for both players.10  That is, neither player is forced to 
accept less than he could guarantee himself by non-cooperative play. 
Acceptability of N for territorial dispute resolution should be ensured by Nash’s 
four axioms: rationality, linear invariance, symmetry, and independence of 
irrelevant alternatives.11  Through these, the solution N produces gains for each 
state that are perceived on par with each other. The durability of a Nash solution 
can be determined by comparing the geographic implementation of N during 
different periods of the dispute. 
 
                                            
8 Jeffrey Berejikian, “A Cognitive Theory of Deterrence,” Journal of Peace Research 39 
no. 2 (2002): 165. 
9 As would occur in the editing phase.  Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 274. 
10 Pareto optimal: there is no other outcome that is better for both players, or better for 
one and equally good for the other.  Philip D. Straffin, Game Theory and Strategy (Washington, 
DC: Mathematical Assoc. of America, 1993), 103. 
11 John F. Nash, Jr., “The Bargaining Problem,” Econometrica 18 no. 2 (1950): 159.  See 
also, John Nash, “Two-Person Cooperative Games,” Econometrica 21 no. 1 (1953): 136–137. 
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E. HYPOTHESES 
From the theory and literature review, this thesis hypothesizes: 
H1:  Applicability 
Territorial disputes are most arbitrable when both states are in a domain of 
gains, and less arbitrable when one or both are in a domain of losses. 
H2:  Acceptability 
If both states are in a domain of gains, the acceptability of Nash arbitration 
in territorial disputes increases (due to of parity of perceived gains). 
H3:  Durability 
Nash arbitration is most durable when dynamic dispute conditions 
generate fewer aberrations to results over time. 
F. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis utilizes two methods to analyze territorial dispute resolution: 
empirical case studies and mathematical modeling. Case studies are utilized to 
determine if prospect theory and Nash arbitration are applicable, acceptable, and 
durable for territorial dispute resolution. Cross-sectional cases explore both the 
applicability (via prospect theory) and acceptability for Nash arbitration solutions, 
and a within-case longitudinal analysis determines the durability of arbitration.   
Within the case studies, prospect theory is operationalized by constructing 
a domain-dependent game that considers each party’s default framing of the 
conflict. This is the first assessment of arbitrability. If required, alternative framing 
is proposed to increase the arbitrability of the dispute. Of those cases deemed 
applicable, Nash arbitration is performed to determine its acceptability and 
durability for territorial dispute resolution.12 
                                            
12 In order to use Nash arbitration, this thesis must assume that disputes for which 
arbitration is applicable are partial-sum games.  The Nash solution depends on determining the 
status quo point of the conflict, which will vary according to dispute conditions (e.g., current line of 
control versus threat/prudential strategies). 
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The literature does not reference Nash arbitration in the context of 
territorial disputes, excluding one source.13  In his thesis, Fulgence Msafiri 
utilizes Nash arbitration to demonstrate a fair resolution to a border dispute 
between Tanzania and Malawi.14  This thesis goes beyond Msafiri’s work by fully 
developing and operationalizing Nash arbitration in territorial disputes. 
Specifically, how is the conflict framed, how are utilities determined, and how are 
the arbitration results (solution points N) geographically implemented?15   
G. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II provides a synopsis of the relevant theory. Fundamentals of 
prospect theory are discussed, as well as how they integrate into territorial 
disputes. Nash arbitration is then summarized, and hypotheses are drawn from 
the theory. Chapter III operationalizes the theory with modeling. Specifically, 
prospect theory is integrated into game theory, and Nash arbitration results are 
geographically implemented. Chapter IV provides a case study of the Kuril 
Islands dispute between Russia and Japan. While the dispute prevents Russia 
and Japan from signing a peace treaty to formally conclude World War II, it 
stands out as a candidate for an arbitrated resolution. A game is constructed, 
arbitration performed, and the result geographically implemented. The durability 
of the arbitrated result is also tested. An additional case study vignette and 
solution is provided in Appendix A. Appendix B contains maps optimized for 
grayscale printing. 
                                            
13 Steven Brams and Jeffrey Togman analyze the fairness of agreements using their 
‘Adjusted Winner’ procedure, which takes into account Nash equilibria.  This, however, is a 
different method than Nash arbitration.  See, Steven J. Brams and Jeffrey M. Togman, “Camp 
David: Was the Agreement Fair?” in A Road Map to War, ed. Paul F. Diehl, 238–253 (Nashville, 
TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1999). 
14 Fulgence Msafiri, “Escalation and Resolution of Border Disputes and Interstate 
Conflicts in Africa: The Malawi—Tanzania Case” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2010). 
15 Barzilai and Peleg offer detailed framework for the analysis of border determination.  
See, Gad Barzilai and Ilan Peleg, “Israel and Future Borders: Assessment of a Dynamic 
Process,” Journal of Peace Research 31 no. 1 (1994).  Also, Hassner discusses the 
entrenchment of long-lasting territorial disputes and requirements for resolution.  See, Ron E. 
Hassner, “The Path to Intractability: Time and the Entrenchment of Territorial Disputes,” 
International Security 31 no. 3 (2006/2007). 
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A. PROSPECT THEORY 
1. Introduction 
Prospect theory is a decision making model which assumes an individual’s 
decisions are made under varying conditions and perceptions of risk. Its central 
assumption is that decisions are influenced by “reference dependence.”  That is, 
people are more sensitive to gains and losses from their specified reference point 
than to overall levels of assets or wealth.16  This leads to interesting implications 
for prospect theory that violate the axioms of expected utility (a generally 
accepted and widely applied theory of decision under conditions of risk).17  
Specifically: how one views, or “frames” her decision can impact the choice 
made; that people are averse to losses and overweigh a loss with respect to a 
comparable gain; and that individuals treat gains differently from losses, creating 
varying risk propensities. 
While expected utility may be more parsimonious than prospect theory,18 
it may not fully explain observed behavior.19  It was evidence of violations of 
expected utility theory that led psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky to publish prospect theory in 1979, and it has since become a leading 
alternative to expected utility. Prospect theory predicts that people will respond to 
certain kinds of situations in ways that “yield distinct and identifiable suboptimal 
outcomes” when compared to a strictly rational approach to the decision, such as 
                                            
16 Jack S. Levy, “An Introduction to Prospect Theory,” Political Psychology 13 no. 2 (1992): 
171, and Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 273. 
17 Including transitivity, dominance, invariance, and cancellation.  Levy, “An Introduction to 
Prospect Theory,” 179. 
18 Jack S. Levy, “Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and 
Analytical Problems,” Political Psychology 13 no. 2 (1992): 296. 
19 See, Dina A. Zinnes and Robert G. Muncaster, “Prospect Theory Versus Expected Utility 
Theory: A Dispute Sequence Appraisal,” in Decision Making in War and Peace, eds. Nehemia 
Geva and Alex Mintz (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), 183; Levy, “An Introduction 
to Prospect Theory,” 173; and Levy, “Loss Aversion, Framing, and Bargaining,” 180–183. 
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expected utility.20  Prospect theory does have limitations, however. It is not as 
theoretically well developed as expected utility theory, and applying a theory on 
individual decision making to the usually collective choices found in international 
relations has difficulties.21  As Tversky and Kahneman state, prospect theory 
should be viewed “as an approximate, incomplete, and simplified description of 
the evaluation of risky prospects.”22  
2. Foundations of Prospect Theory 
Kahneman and Tversky’s research has many findings regarding an 
individual’s decision making under risk. Asking hypothetical questions that 
generally regard monetary exchanges (e.g., Would you rather have a 50 percent 
chance of winning $1,000, or would you rather have a guaranteed $450?), they 
demonstrated several phenomena that violate the tenets of expected utility 
theory.23  These prospect theory foundations are summarized below. 
a. Reference Point 
People tend to think in terms of gains and losses, rather than in 
terms of absolute (or final) assets. This categorizes choices as gains or losses 
from a reference point. While the specified reference point is often the status 
quo, this is not always the case. Individuals may have a foregone conclusion of 
                                            
20 Barbara Farnham ed., Avoiding Losses / Taking Risks (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of 
Michigan Press, 1994), 2. 
21 Despite theoretical weaknesses regarding the editing phase of prospect theory (see Jack 
S. Levy, “Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations,” International Studies 
Quarterly 41 no. 1 [1997]: 100–102), it is well suited to this thesis and retains explanatory power. 
Regarding the difficulties of moving from individual choice to collective choice, see James D. 
Morrow, “A Rational Choice Approach to International Conflict,” in Decision Making in War and 
Peace, 16; Jack S. Levy, “Prospect Theory and the Cognitive-Rational Debate,” in Decision 
Making in War and Peace, 43–46; and Levy, “Prospect Theory and International Relations,” 292–
293.  The literature supports prospect theory as an alternative to analyze state decisions in 
international relations (see multiple examples in Political Psychology 13 no. 2 [1992]), and this 
thesis intends to move forward with the debate vice remaining paralyzed for a better solution.  
22 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of 
Choice,” Science 211 no. 4481 (1981): 454. 
23 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 264. 
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certain gains, and use this “aspiration level” as their reference point.24  
Alternatively, individuals may have suffered a loss and use their prior asset 
position as a reference. Selecting the reference point is heavily dependent on the 
framing of the decision, which is discussed later in this chapter. 
This “reference dependence”25 replaces a utility function defined 
over all asset levels (as found in expected utility) with a value function defined 
over deviations from the reference point.26  Reference dependence is important 
because individuals overvalue losses relative to comparable gains. This is 
depicted by the steeper value function on the loss side, as opposed to the gains 
side of the function (Figure 1). This is also a key tenet of loss aversion, discussed 
later in this chapter. 
 
Figure 1.   Hypothetical value function.27 
                                            
24 Levy, “An Introduction to Prospect Theory,” 174. 
25 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-
Dependent Model,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 106 no. 4 (1991): 1039. 
26 Levy, “Loss Aversion, Framing, and Bargaining,” 181. 
27 From Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 279. 
 10
b. Reflection Effect 
People treat losses differently than gains. Specifically, they are risk 
averse when dealing with gains, and risk seeking when dealing with losses. For 
example, Kahneman and Tversky found that 80 percent of subjects would prefer 
a guaranteed $3,000 to a gamble with an 80 percent chance of $4,000 and a 20 
percent chance of nothing.28  Expected utility places the value of the gamble at 
$3,200 and a rational choice would be to maximize gains and take the wager. 
However, prospect theory states that individuals are risk averse with regards to 
gains, thus explaining why the majority of people chose the lesser, though 
certain, amount. 
Conversely, when dealing with losses, 92 percent of subjects 
preferred a gamble with an 80 percent chance of losing $4,000 and a 20 percent 
chance of losing nothing to a certain loss of $3,000. Again, expected utility would 
presume an individual would minimize his losses and take the sure loss of 
$3,000 over the gamble, which has an expected value of $3,200. However, the 
vast majority of subjects were risk seeking by taking the gamble in the hopes that 
they could completely avoid a loss. A sure loss of $3,000 is more traumatic than 
the potential loss of $4,000.   
Both of these experiments violate expected utility axioms. 
Kahneman and Tversky suggest that individual utility functions are concave in 
the domain of gains and convex in the domain of losses. They term this the 
“reflection effect.”29  These curved functions are seen in Figure 1. Not only is the 
loss curve steeper, as previously discussed, but it is convex; the gains function is 
concave. 
                                            
28 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 268. 
29 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 268. 
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c.  Loss Aversion and the Endowment Effect 
People treat gains and losses differently in that “losses loom larger 
than gains,” which produces different risk orientations for losses or gains.30  
Simply, the pleasure of finding $20 is less than the pain of losing $20. This 
explains an individual’s loss aversion and a preference for the status quo, instead 
of a symmetric (50/50) bet of winning or losing the same absolute value (e.g., win 
$1,000 or lose $1,000).31  Called the “status quo bias” in economics and other 
fields, it is perhaps better to refer to this phenomena as a “reference point bias” 
when utilizing it in the field of international relations, as the status quo may not be 
a state’s chosen reference point.   
People also value what they already possess more highly than 
comparable things they do not have—actually possessing the item adds value to 
it.32  The endowment effect is this “over-evaluation of current possessions.”33  
The effect presents problems for utility theory because preferences between A 
and B could reverse, simply because A may be part of one’s endowment. Also, 
the length one possesses a good and the difficulty or effort required to acquire it 
increases its value to the owner.   
d. Framing 
Framing can be considered the identification of the reference point. 
The information one uses to create their entering position into the decision 
affects how they will view the decision—from a loss frame or a gains frame. 
Thus, framing the choice becomes a critical part of prospect theory, particularly in 
cases of bargaining, where outsiders or competitors may want to influence a 
decision by managing, or even manipulating, how a decision is framed. 
                                            
30 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 279. 
31 Levy, “Loss Aversion, Framing, and Bargaining,” 181. 
32 Another way to view this effect is people often will not sell an item they own for a price 
they would not even consider buying it at.  See, Jack L. Knetsch and J. A. Sinden, “Willingness to 
Pay and Compensation Demanded: Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in 
Measures of Value,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 99 no. 3 (1984): 507–521. 
33 Levy, “An Introduction to Prospect Theory,” 175. 
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In an illustrative example, Tversky and Kahneman found a reversal 
in preferences for an identical decision due to framing—whether it is was positive 
or negative.34  Subjects were asked to choose between two medical responses 
for a disease outbreak that was expected to kill 600 people. The first group was 
asked if they preferred option A, which would save 200 people, or option B, 
which had a one-third chance to save all 600, but a two-thirds chance that all 600 
would die. A vast majority, 72 percent, chose the conservative option of saving 
200 people. The second group of subjects was asked essentially the same 
question, but framed negatively. In option A, 400 would die. Option B, however, 
had a one-third chance all 600 could be saved. A strong majority of 78 percent 
chose the gamble—the riskier option. In the domain of gains (saving lives), 
people were risk averse and chose the guaranteed outcome of saving 200 lives; 
in the domain of losses (choosing who dies), people were risk seeking and 
selected the gamble that could result in the death of all 600.   
This reversal in preferences was due to the subject group viewing 
the problem through either a gains frame (How many can I save?) or a losses 
frame (How many is my decision going to kill?). All options, regardless of 
framing, have an expected value of 200 living and 400 dying. However, the 
transitivity of preferences was violated based on how the question was 
presented, or framed. Expected utility fails in this area, but prospect theory has 
strong explanatory power. Whether an individual frames the decision in terms of 
gains or losses “has a significant impact on preferences despite the 
mathematical equivalence of the two choice problems.”35   
The process of framing a choice can become complicated, based 
how an individual responds to the situation, particularly if there is a succession of 
choices and an unclear status quo.36  As political scientist Jack Levy 
summarizes: 
                                            
34 Tversky and Kahneman, “The Framing of Decisions,” 453. 
35 Levy, “An Introduction to Prospect Theory,” 177. 
36 As is often the case in international relations. 
 13
Is the reference point for each choice problem framed cumulatively 
with respect to one’s asset position at the beginning of the series of 
choices, or with respect to one’s asset position at each individual 
choice? A gambler who sustains a series of losses will be more 
inclined to be risk acceptant if he or she adopts the cumulative 
frame of the asset position at the beginning of the evening and 
attempts to recover losses, whereas one who uses current asset 
levels would be more risk averse. Someone on a winning streak, 
however, will be more risk averse if he or she frames the choice in 
terms of initial assets rather than total assets at the time of each 
new bet.37 
Key to framing is how quickly individuals accommodate to their 
gains or losses. Accommodating to losses creates risk aversion (feeling no need 
to recover sunk costs) and accommodating to gains creates risk seeking (to keep 
the gains recently acquired). How long it takes to renormalize to gains or losses 
has significant impact on framing the choice, particularly regarding strategic 
interactions. Both parties can be put into a domain of losses if one benefits at the 
other’s expense. For example, the first party may accommodate to gains quickly 
and become risk seeking to protect them, while the second party has not 
accommodated to the loss and is risk seeking to regain them. This produces two 
risk-seeking parties in a domain of losses, a potentially volatile combination in 
international relations.   
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler have observed an “instant 
endowment effect,” where greater value is assigned to an object as soon as it 
becomes a possession.38  This implies that individuals become accommodated 
to gains more quickly than they accommodate to losses, and reinforces the 
dichotomy that may occur in strategic interactions with two differing reference 
points. 
Although prospect theory does not have a formal theory of framing, 
it does suggest that it is influenced by the “norms, habits, and expectancies of 
                                            
37 Levy, “An Introduction to Prospect Theory,” 177. 
38 Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler, “Experimental Tests of the 
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem,” Journal of Political Economy 98 no. 6 (1990): 1342. 
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decision makers.”39  Unlike rational choice models, prospect theory is both 
historical and contextual when dealing with international relations, and reference 
points will reflect the experiences and expectations of the decision makers and 
the type of problems they face.40 
e.  Certainty Effect 
People overweigh outcomes that are certain relative to outcomes 
that are merely probable. Kahneman and Tversky have labeled this the “certainty 
effect,” and it produces outcomes that again violate expected utility. For example, 
when given the choice between option A: $2,500 with probability .33, $2,400 with 
probability .66 and $0 with probability of .01; or option B: $2400 with certainty, 
they found 82 percent of respondents chose option B, the certain outcome.41 
This selection violates expected utility theory, which predicts an individual will 
maximize gains and select option A. Consequently, changes in probabilities near 
0 or 1 have a greater impact on preferences then the same change in probability 
in the middle of the probability range (e.g., 0.5). 
This effect implies a non-linear response to probabilities, 
contrasting the linear combination of utilities and probabilities in expected utility 
theory.42  As Levy succinctly states, “people attach greater value to the complete 
elimination of risk than to the reduction of risk by a comparable amount.”43  
Difficulty arises at the ends of the spectrum, where behavior may become 
unpredictable. As Kahneman and Tversky state:  
Because people are limited in their ability to comprehend and 
evaluate extreme probabilities, highly unlikely events are either 
                                            
39 Janice Gross Stein, “International Co-operation and Loss Avoidance: Framing the 
Problem,” in Choosing to Co-operate: How States Avoid Loss, eds. Janice Gross Stein and Louis 
W. Pauly (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 17. 
40 Stein, “International Co-operation and Loss Avoidance,” 18. 
41 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 265. 
42 Levy, “Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations,” 91. 
43 Levy, “Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations,” 91. 
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ignored or overweighed, and the differences between high 
probability and certainty is either neglected or exaggerated.44 
The certainty effect also interacts with the reflection effect, 
reinforcing risk-seeking or risk-avoiding behavior. Certain gains are overweighed, 
and induce greater risk avoidance; certain losses are also overweighed, inducing 
risk-seeking (gambling) behavior.45 
f.  Isolation Effect 
People often simplify the choice between two alternatives, and to 
do so they disregard shared attributes and focus on distinguishing features.46  
This approach produces inconsistent preferences because choices can be 
distilled into distinctive components in more than one way. Just like framing, the 
different decompositions of the choice can lead to different preferences. 
Kahneman and Tversky clearly demonstrated the isolation effect, 
also called cancellation, with two sample problems. In the first, subjects were 
told, “In addition to whatever you own, you have been given 1,000.”47  They then 
had the choice between option A: an additional 1,000 at 50/50 odds; or option B: 
a guaranteed additional 500. Eighty-four percent selected option B, the sure gain 
of 500. In the second problem, the subject group was told, “In addition to 
whatever you own, you have been given 2,000.”48  The subjects then could 
choose option C: a loss of 1,000 at 50/50 odds; or option D: the certain loss of 
500. Sixty-nine percent selected option C, the even bet of a 1,000 loss. Although 
when viewed as final end states, option A equals option C, and option B equals 
option D, individual preferences were reversed based on how the questions were 
decomposed. Specifically, the bonuses of 1,000 in the first problem and 2,000 in  
 
                                            
44 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 282–283. 
45 Levy, “Loss Aversion, Framing, and Bargaining,” 185. 
46 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 271. 
47 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 273. 
48 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 273. 
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the second problem were common to both prospects presented, and summarily 
ignored. This left the problems to be viewed as gains or losses, and the reflection 
effect came shining through.  
3. Process 
Prospect theory is broken into two phases, an editing phase, and a 
subsequent evaluation phase. Editing involves the initial analysis of the problem. 
Specifically, identifying the options, their associated outcomes and 
consequences, and the values and probabilities attached to each. It also includes 
the organization (or reorganization) of the problem to simplify evaluation. During 
the evaluation phase, the edited prospects are evaluated and the prospect with 
the highest value is chosen.49  Kahneman and Tversky developed the formal 
model for evaluating prospects,50 but the theory behind editing is less 
developed.51 
a. Editing 
The process of editing can be broken down into simpler elements, 
described below. 
(1)  Coding.   The outcomes of prospects are coded as 
“gains or losses, rather than final states of wealth or welfare.”52  This coding is a 
result of the selection of the reference point and the framing of the outcomes as 
gains or losses from the selected point. As previously discussed, coding of the 
problem has significant impacts on which prospect is selected. 
(2)  Combination and Segregation. Prospects that have 
identical outcomes can have their probabilities combined. For example, a 
prospect of (500, .30; 500, .30) is combined to (500, .60), or a 60 percent chance 
                                            
49 Levy, “An Introduction to Prospect Theory,” 180. 
50 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 275–284. 
51 See, Rose McDermott, “Prospect Theory in Political Science: Gains and Losses From the 
First Decade,” Political Psychology 25 no. 2 (2004): 304–305, for a state of the theory. 
52 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 274. 
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of gaining 500. Similarly, riskless parts of prospects are segregated out, so the 
risky portion of the prospect can be evaluated. For example, the prospect of 
(300, .75; 400, .25) will be segregated into a sure gain of 300, and a 25 percent 
chance of an additional 100.   The inverse, when dealing with losses instead of 
gains, is identical. 
(3)  Cancellation. A result of the isolation effect, cancellation 
during the editing phase results in individuals ignoring or discarding parts of 
prospects that are shared or common (such as the bonuses in the example given 
previously for the isolation effect). Another form of cancellation occurs with 
sequential decisions. Two prospects may have an identical first decision, which 
individuals often discard or ignore, and compare the prospects on the differences 
in the subsequent decisions. This is despite the fact that they would likely make a 
different choice if they factored in the common first decision.53 
(4)  Simplification and Detection of Dominance. Probabilities 
can be rounded—and very unlikely ones even discarded—during simplification. 
For example, the prospect (101, .49) will likely be analyzed as (100, .50) and an 
outcome with probability of 0.000001 will likely be discarded. Prospects are also 
scanned for dominated outcomes, which are rightly rejected without further 
evaluation.54 
The sequence one uses to edit prospects can alter further editing, 
and therefore possibly the prospect selected. For example, a prospect may be 
simplified, which then creates a dominated—and therefore rejected—outcome 
that may have not been otherwise. The ambiguity in this area is a result of the 
weakness in the theory underpinning the editing phase of prospect theory. 
Kahneman and Tversky did not formulate a model, and one has not been 
presented to date. 
                                            
53 For an excellent example of how prospects can be decomposed in more than one way, 
see Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 271. 
54 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 275. 
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b. Evaluating 
After editing, an individual selects the prospect with the highest 
value, denoted V, which is comprised of two scales, a weighting function, π, and 
a value function, v.55  The first scale, π, associates with each probability p, a 
“decision weight” π(p). This “reflects the impact of p on the over-all value of the 
prospect.”56  The second scale, v, assigns to each outcome x a value v(x) “which 
reflects the subjective value of that outcome.”57  The reference point serves as 
the zero for the value scale, therefore, v measures gains or losses from the 
reference point. 
Kahneman and Tversky enumerated prospect theory into two 
equations, one for strictly positive or negative prospects (all outcomes are 
positive or negative) or one for regular prospects (those with outcomes that can 
be positive, negative, or zero). In the prospect (x, p; y, q), one receives outcome x 
with probability p, outcome y with probability q, and nothing with probability  
1 – p – q, if p + q ≤ 1. If (x, p; y, q) is a regular prospect, then Equation (1) 
determines the value.58 
 
(1) V(x, p; y, q) = π(p)v(x) + π(q)v(y) 
 
The editing of strictly positive or negative prospects creates a 
different equation. Because the prospects are segregated into risky and risk-less 
components, there is a sure gain (or loss), and an additional gain (loss) that is at 
stake. If (x, p; y, q) is strictly positive or negative, that is, p + q = 1, and either  
x > y > 0 or x < y < 0, then Equation (2) determines the value.59 
 
(2) V(x, p; y, q) = v(y) + π(p)[v(x) – v(y)] 
                                            
55 This thesis will maintain Kahneman and Tversky’s notation for prospect theory elements. 
56 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 275. 
57 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 275. 
58 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 276. 
59 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 276. 
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In Equation (2), it can be seen that the riskless component, v(y), 
does not have a decision weight, π(p), applied to it; instead it is applied to the 
risky component, which is the value difference v(x) – v(y). 
(1)  The Value Function. Prospect theory’s value function, v, 
has three main characteristics: it is defined on deviations from a reference point, 
rather than net position; it is concave for gains and convex for losses; and it is 
steeper for losses than it is for gains.60  Therefore, it takes into account loss 
aversion, coding (i.e., reference dependence), and the reflection effect. Refer to 
Figure 1 for a hypothetical value function. 
(2)  The Weighting Function. In prospect theory, the value of 
each outcome is multiplied by a decision weight, π. In essence, π measures how 
desirable a prospect is based upon its probability. It is non-linear and has several 
characteristics. First, it is not well behaved near the endpoints. This reflects 
unpredictability of behavior with extremely small or large probabilities. Second, 
because π(0) = 0 and π(1) = 1, there is subsequently a sharp increase in the 
weighting function at the end points.61  This disproportionately affects the 
evaluation of prospects with high or low probabilities. Third, the slope of π is less 
than 1, except for small regions near the endpoints. The means the sum of 
decision weights to complimentary events are less than the weight given to a 
certain event (i.e., they are subadditive), which is reflected in the certainty effect. 
Finally, small probabilities are overweighed while larger probabilities are 
underweighed. This can be seen in the depiction of the weighting function in 
Figure 2, where probabilities below the 0.10 – 0.15 range have an increased 
(overweighed) decision weight.62   
                                            
60 Levy, “An Introduction to Prospect Theory,” 181. 
61 As Kahneman and Tversky state, “outcomes contingent on an impossible event are 
ignored, and the scale is normalized so that π(p) is the ratio of the weight associated with the 
probability p to the weight associated with the certain event.”  Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect 
Theory,” 280. 
62 Levy, “An Introduction to Prospect Theory,” 182–183. 
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Figure 2.   Hypothetical weighting function.63 
An example will best show how the value function and weighting 
function interact. Kahneman and Tversky found 72 percent of respondents 
preferred (5,000, .001) over (5). This implies,64  
π(.001)v(5,000) > v(5), hence,  
π(.001) > v(5) / v(5,000) > .001 
This shows the overweighting of small probabilities, that is  
π(p) > p. Kahneman and Tversky also suggest that for all 0 < p < 1, π(p) + π(1-p)  
< 1, hence the weighting function slope is less than 1 for most of its range.65 
When applying prospect theory to international relations, it is not 
sufficient to apply the S-shaped value function alone. It must be combined with 
the weighting function to determine risk propensities. Jack Levy writes about their 
integration: 
                                            
63 From Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 283. 
64 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 281. 
65 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory,” 281. 
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In the domain of gains where perceived probabilities are above the 
transition point from overweighting to underweighting (where the 
weighting function crosses the 45 degree diagonal, at 
approximately p = .10 - .15), the underweighting of probabilities 
works together with the concavity of the value function to 
undervalue the gamble relative to the certain outcome, and thus to 
encourage risk aversion. In the domain of losses, the 
underweighting of probabilities (above the probability transition 
point) reduces the weights given to risky negative prospects, makes 
them less unattractive, and thus encourages risk seeking. In these 
probability ranges, the effects of the value function and the 
probability weighting function are thus mutually reinforcing.66   
Thus, not only must the value of a prospect be analyzed, but the 
weight assigned to its probability as well. This is particularly important for the 
areas of high and low probability. Unfortunately, this is also where it is most 
difficult to accomplish, due to the increased variance in the weighting function in 
these areas. 
4. Integrating Prospect Theory into Territorial Disputes 
The essence of territorial disputes changes over time based on the value 
and the nature of territory. Forsberg believes the strategic and economic value of 
territory is declining compared to years past, and that disputes generated by self-
determination and historical ownership are becoming more current.67  What has 
not changed, however, is each dispute is unique in its causes and solutions. 
Prospect theory provides a different framework than more traditional rational 
models to analyze territorial disputes. This alternative point of view may provide 
better insight into a dispute’s genesis and possible conclusions. To this end, this 
section will integrate the principles and lexicon of prospect theory into territorial 
disputes. 
                                            
66 Levy, “An Introduction to Prospect Theory,” 183. 
67 Forsberg, “Explaining Territorial Disputes,” 439. 
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a. Reference Point 
Defining the reference point for each participant in a territorial 
dispute is vital, as it is the foundation upon which prospect theory builds. Ideally, 
both parties would share an easily identifiable, common reference point, such as 
the status quo. However, states (or more precisely, their leaders) may use their 
aspirations or expectations to define their reference point.68  This is likely when 
the status quo represents a loss of territory from a previous reference point that 
has not yet been accommodated.69  Alternatively, states may quickly 
accommodate to a recent gain of territory and establish a new reference point 
from a position that the international community has not yet recognized as the 
status quo. 
What the status quo does provide, however, is a starting point from 
which to analyze each state’s options. Since it is the existing state of 
cartographic affairs, states have only two options: preserve it, or change it. If a 
state wishes to change the status quo, the degree to which it desires change is 
reflective of its dissatisfaction with the current situation. Therefore, highly 
unsatisfied states are likely to have a reference point far from the recognized 
status quo. 
If a territorial dispute has a well-defined status quo and borders 
have been static for an extended period of time, then the status quo is a likely 
candidate as the reference point for both parties. However, as Levy states, 
“variations in the [selection of] reference points are particularly likely to arise in 
dynamic situations, where there is no well-defined and salient status quo that 
might serve as an obvious focal point for framing.”70  Unfortunately, prospect 
theory cannot predict the reference point that states are likely to select. However,  
 
                                            
68 Levy also acknowledges, “Social norms, and social comparisons… can influence the 
framing of the reference point.”  Levy, “Prospect Theory and the Cognitive-Rational Debate,” 36. 
69 Stein, “International Co-operation and Loss Avoidance,” 15. 
70 Levy, “Prospect Theory and the Cognitive-Rational Debate,” 36. 
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reference points reflect “leaders’ experiences and expectations,” and through 
examination they can possibly be reconstructed to aid in the analysis of past 
decisions, or predict future ones.71 
From whatever selected reference point, states will view their 
situation as either that of gains or losses. Because prospect theory predicts that 
a gains frame leads to risk-adverse behavior, a territorial dispute is more stable if 
both parties are in a gains frame. Conversely, unstable disputes result when one 
or both belligerents are in a losses frame. Stable disputes are characterized by 
status quos that are tenable for both parties, but resolution may provide what can 
be seen as a loss for one party (be it territory, access to resources, or simply a 
historical claim). However, resolution can also possibly provide gains for both 
parties by removing the costs of conflict; the status quo bias is perhaps the culprit 
standing in the way of compromise in this case. How the territorial dispute is 
framed is instrumental in determining the reference point, and therefore the gains 
or losses frame. This is further discussed later in this section. 
b. Reflection Effect 
Once a state’s reference point is established, changes to it 
(because of open conflict or dispute resolution) will be viewed as losses or gains. 
Prospect theory predicts that states in a gains frame are risk adverse, and will be 
acceptant to a small loss in territory in order to avoid the possibility of a larger 
loss. Conversely, states in a losses frame are risk seeking and are willing to 
gamble a significant loss of territory for the possibility to make a gain. In actuality, 
a state in this frame likely does not view the prospect as making a gain, but more 
likely as recovering a former loss. This can provide explanations why weaker 
nations will enter armed conflict with an overly powerful opponent (e.g., Argentina 
                                            
71 Stein, “International Co-operation and Loss Avoidance,” 18. 
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and the United Kingdom in the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas conflict).72  The 
reflection effect underscores the importance of determining a state’s reference 
point if prospect theory is going to be useful in analyzing a state’s actions 
regarding a territorial dispute. 
It is important to note that, while a border dispute is typically a zero-
sum game cartographically, it should not be limited to being framed in such a 
restrictive condition.73  That is to say, it is possible for both belligerents to be in a 
gains frame or for both to be in a losses frame. A gain of territory for one 
(implying a loss of territory from the other) does not mean a gains frame for one 
and a loss frame for the other. The reflection effect can work to both sides’ 
benefit or detriment, depending on how frames align. Simply because one state 
may gain territory does not place the other state in a domain of loss. 
c. Endowment Effect 
Territory inherently lends itself towards conflict. It is easily viewed 
as something possessed, and has inherent value for multiple reasons (e.g., 
resources, populations, markets, strategic access, nationalism, etc.).74  Territory 
is also something that armies for millennia have known how to defend against 
loss. Simply put, the sense of ownership is strong. The endowment effect, 
therefore, is influential in territorial disputes. It affects judgments of what is fair 
and just, as the adage “possession is nine-tenths of the law” attests. Supreme 
Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said it eloquently: 
It is in the nature of man’s mind. A thing which you have enjoyed 
and used as your own for a long time, whether property or an 
                                            
72 Prospect theory can do much to explain actions taken by the governments on both sides 
of this South Atlantic war, particularly if both viewed the situation from a losses frame.  It can 
provide answers to many of the questions raised by Arquilla and Rasmussen, such as, “[T]he 
puzzle of why Argentina's military first agitated for war and then, when conflict appeared 
imminent, opted to fight while withholding their key assets safe from harm.”  John Arquilla and 
María Moyano Rasmussen, “The Origins of the South Atlantic War,” Journal of Latin American 
Studies 33 no. 4 (2001): 760. 
73 See, Forsberg, “Explaining Territorial Disputes,” 438–439. 
74 Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson, “Contested Territory, Strategic Rivalries, and 
Conflict Escalation,” International Studies Quarterly 50 no. 1 (2006): 146–147. 
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opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be torn away without 
your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, however you 
came by it. The law can ask no better justification than the deepest 
instincts of man.75 
The endowment effect thus factors significantly into a state’s view 
of a border dispute.   Any territorial concession that a state may give as part of 
bargaining will be viewed as more valuable by the giving state then by the 
receiving state. It also gives heavy weight towards using the status quo as a 
starting point for any territorial dispute resolution, despite what reference points 
other states may hold (e.g., aspiration levels). The legal implications of the 
endowment effect are also relevant, particularly with uti possidetis juris and uti 
possidetis facto. 
d. Certainty Effect 
The certainty effect, combined with the reflection effect, produces 
risk-seeking behavior in territorial disputes. Specifically, a state may view inaction 
on their territorial claim as a sure loss. Prospect theory predicts this certain loss 
will be overweighed, and if the state is in a losses frame, gambling behavior is 
expected. Therefore, rather than remaining inactive, states in a losses frame 
would risk a larger loss of territory in open conflict (so long as there is a 
possibility of a gain) then take a sure, albeit small, loss. This type of undesirable 
situation can be skirted if the conflict is framed properly on both sides. In this 
case, if a state does not view its position as being “inactive,” the negative 
implications of the certainty effect can be avoided. 
e. Isolation Effect 
Because territorial disputes can be decomposed in different 
manners (e.g., based on territory size, population, resource wealth, etc.), the 
isolation effect must be considered for dispute resolution. Specifically, how the 
dispute is decomposed can affect how a state views the situation—from a losses 
                                            
75 Oliver Wendell Holmes, “The Path of the Law,” Harvard Law Review 10 no. 8 (1897): 477. 
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frame or a gains frame. When bargaining options are constructed, including 
concessions and grants, the isolation effect will cause states to simplify the 
choices, disregarding shared attributes. For example, if an option is presented in 
which both states will divide an attribute equally (e.g., a claim to a lake), that 
attribute will likely be ignored in order to focus on areas where the presentations 
differ. Because this thesis hypothesizes disputes are most arbitrable when both 
states are in a gains frame, options should be framed so that states are not 
aggregating—and thus disregarding—gains as much as possible. 
f. Framing 
Framing a choice for an individual in a laboratory experiment is 
relatively easy compared to framing a series of decisions a nation’s leader(s) 
must make regarding a territorial dispute. Despite prospect theory’s weak 
underpinning in this area, the endeavor must be attempted in order to utilize the 
theory’s explanatory power. 
Boettcher divides framing into three specific elements of a choice, 
“The actor’s perception of the alternative courses of action, the outcomes 
associated with those alternatives, and the probabilities associated with particular 
outcomes.”76  These elements will be useful for the analysis of a state’s framing, 
and particularly for properly framing choices for an arbitrated solution. This thesis 
hypothesizes that disputes are most arbitrable when both states are in a gains 
frame. As such, and in order to aid negotiations, the focus should not be: 
…on what has been lost or what can be gained, but rather on how 
to prevent future losses with a treaty. Agreements should be 
framed not only in terms of how peace represents a positive gain, 
but also in terms of how it prevents further loss of life and 
property.77   
                                            
76 William A. Boettcher III, “The Prospects for Prospect Theory: An Empirical Evaluation of 
International Relations Applications of Framing and Loss Aversion,” Political Psychology 25 no. 3 
(2004): 333. 
77 McDermott, “Prospect Theory in Political Science,” 299. 
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McDermott argues context is a key factor in determining a state’s 
domain (whether it is gains or losses). Context incorporates not only the situation 
and circumstances of the moment, but also the history of the event, the actors, 
and the trajectory.78  All of these can be researched and analyzed in a territorial 
dispute. 
Many of the cognitive effects described previously are intertwined 
with framing; that is, they either influence it or are influenced by it. In order to limit 
some of the negative effects of these principles, the notion of a bargaining chip is 
valuable. This is particularly useful in tempering loss aversion and the 
endowment effect. Without the notion of a bargaining chip, a concession can be 
viewed as a loss, and the compensation received from the other party as a gain. 
If these exchanges are on par, the endowment effect makes a state’s concession 
more valuable than the compensation it receives, and it is therefore unsatisfied. 
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler have dubbed this “concession aversion.”79   
However, the same researchers also note that loss aversion and 
the endowment effect do not affect all trading, such as “normal commercial 
transaction[s].”80  This is fundamental to the use of a bargaining chip. As Levy 
writes, 
This implies that if concessions involve a “bargaining chip” and 
especially if the “chip” was acquired or created with that purpose in 
mind, the asymmetry of value attached to concessions given and 
compensation received is likely to be much less, so that the 
likelihood of a successful compromise would be larger.81 
Therefore, framing—when possible—territory, resources, access 
routes, etc., as a bargaining chip will help create an environment that can keep 
                                            
78 McDermott, “Prospect Theory in Political Science,” 300. 
79 Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, “Experimental Tests,” 1345. 
80 Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler, “Anomalies: The Endowment 
Effect, Loss Aversion and Status Quo Bias,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 5 no. 1 
(1991): 200. 
81 Levy, “Loss Aversion, Framing, and Bargaining,” 187. 
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the dispute parties in a dual-gains frame, and possibly reach a non-violent, 
arbitrated resolution. 
Before getting to arbitration, however, this thesis postulates that 
both states need to be in a gains frame. This will obviously not include all 
territorial disputes. Conflicts characterized by irredentism and sub-national ethnic 
groups are easily framed with emotional supports, and leaders may even desire 
a domain of losses to define their cause. It is hypothesized that arbitration will not 
produce an acceptable or enduring resolution for these cases. 
5. Prospect Theory Summary 
Prospect theory provides unique explanations for failures in expected 
utility theory, in that individuals ultimately view their decisions as gains or losses 
from a chosen reference point. Transferring prospect theory into international 
relations, specifically territorial disputes, allows this thesis to analyze states’ 
framing of disputes, ideally determining which disputes have the potential to be 
resolved non-violently through arbitration. 
B. NASH ARBITRATION 
1. Introduction 
In 1928, John von Neumann published the fundamental theorem of two-
person, zero-sum games.82  From this mathematical foundation, von Neumann 
and Oskar Morgenstern published the seminal Theory of Games and Economic 
Behavior in 1944.83  From here, game theory—a mathematical theory of 
conflict—developed rapidly and spread to many disciplines, particularly the social 
sciences. 
Straffin describes game theory as “the logical analysis of situations of 
conflict and cooperation,” and specifically defines a game as situations in which: 
                                            
82 J. v. Neumann, “Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele,” Mathematische Annalen 100 no. 1 
(1928): 295–320. 
83 John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1944). 
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i)  There are at least two players. A player may be an individual, but 
it may also be a more general entity like a company, a nation, or 
even a biological species. 
ii)  Each player has a number of possible strategies, courses of 
action which he or she may choose to follow. 
iii)  The strategies chosen by each player determine the outcome of 
the game. 
iv)  Associated to each possible outcome of the game is a collection 
of numerical payoffs, one to each player. These payoffs represent 
the value of the outcome to the different players.84 
Game theory studies how players should rationally play these games to 
achieve the largest payoff possible. Of course, one player’s choice is only part of 
the game. The opposite player(s) has strategies to choose as well, and may base 
theirs on choices they presume their competition may make. This strategic 
interaction is the heart of game theory. 
As one way to solve a game, players can “[sit] down together to decide 
what is a reasonable or fair outcome to the game, and then [agree] to implement 
that outcome.”85  This essentially is arbitration. This process allows the players to 
achieve results that are perhaps better (i.e., both receive higher payoffs) than if 
they were playing the game non-cooperatively or without communication. Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern held that any reasonable arbitrated solution for a 
non-zero-sum game should be both Pareto optimal and above each player’s 
security level (i.e., what they could guarantee themselves with non-cooperative 
play).86   
                                            
84 Straffin, Game Theory, 3.  Italics in original text. 
85 Straffin, Game Theory, 102. 
86 John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 
2nd ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1947), 262.  All subsequent citations refer to 
this edition. 
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Mathematician John Nash proposed such a solution in 1950.87  He 
abstracted a two-person bargaining situation in order to create a mathematical 
model that provides a solution, or value, for each party.88  Each person’s utilities 
for possible outcomes are plotted on a coordinate plane that graphically 
represents a feasible region of outcomes, or a “payoff polygon.”  The polygon, by 
definition, is “compact and convex,” bounding all outcomes to the problem.89  
Within the polygon is a status quo point, a default payoff both parties receive if 
they fail to negotiate (or simply do not play). Payoffs above the status quo values 
are considered the “negotiation set,” and bargaining or arbitration seeks to 
maximize these payoffs for each party.   
2. Axioms 
Nash’s bargaining scheme is based on four axioms that he believed a 
reasonable scheme should satisfy. It ultimately produces a single solution, N, that 
provides the best outcome for both players. 
Axiom 1: Rationality. The solution point should be in the negotiation set. 
Axiom 2: Linear Invariance. If either player’s utilities are transformed by a 
positive linear function, the solution point should be transformed by the 
same function. 
Axiom 3: Symmetry. If the polygon is symmetric about a line through the 
status quo with a slope of +1, the solution point should be on this line. 
Axiom 4: Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. If a payoff region that 
does not contain the solution is deleted but the status quo point 
remains the same, then the solution should remain the same.90 
These axioms are graphically displayed with payoff polygons in Figure 3. 
                                            
87 John F. Nash, Jr., “The Bargaining Problem,” Econometrica 18 no. 2 (1950): 155–162.  
For additional arbitration solutions, see James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), and Anatol Rapoport, N-Person Game Theory: 
Concepts and Applications (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, Inc., 2001). 
88 Nash defines a value as “a set of numbers which depend continuously upon the set of 
quantities comprising the mathematical description of the game and which express the utility to 
each player of the opportunity to engage in the game.”  Nash, “The Bargaining Problem,” 157.   
89 Nash, “The Bargaining Problem,” 158. 




Figure 3.   Nash axioms displayed with payoff polygons.91 
3. Solution 
Nash proves there is one, and only one, solution that satisfies all four 
axioms. That is, if SQ = (X0, Y0), then the solution N is the point (X, Y) in the 
polygon with X ≥ X0 and Y ≥ Y0 that maximizes the product (X – X0)(Y – Y0), as 
shown in Equation (3).92 
 
(3) N = maximize (X – X0)(Y – Y0) 
   
This calculation is relatively modest, as it simply maximizes each player’s 
utilities from possible outcomes in the negotiation set (i.e., those above the status 
quo point). This leads to an important point—defining the status quo. 
The influence of the status quo within Nash’s scheme provides a strength 
for the purposes of this thesis, as it takes into account each player’s strategic 
                                            
91 From Straffin, Game Theory, 104. 
92 Straffin, Game Theory, 105. 
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position with regards to their opponent. For example, the status quo may be 
defined as each player’s security position (their payoff is secure, regardless of 
the other player’s moves), or in more acrimonious cases, the status quo point 
may be determined by threat strategies (the other player’s move reduces both 
player’s payoffs) may be a more appropriate.93 
4. Implications 
The solution provided by Nash provides each party with a payoff that 
should be considered fair, and the best they can expect given the strategic 
situation. For the power it holds, it is relatively easy to compute. However, 
translating this numerical value in terms of a utility function into tangible assets or 
other results is a challenge. For example, the arbitration scheme may determine 
that one player receives 4/7ths of a particular asset in dispute, but the asset may 
not lend itself to physical division. Similarly, if the asset can by physically divided, 
it may not be homogenous (such as territory in varying terrain), with some areas 
“better” or more valuable. Which 4/7ths does the party then receive, and who 
should determine this?  The next chapter on modeling will discuss these 
challenges. Specifically, how a territorial dispute and the status quo can be 
modeled, both in terms of prospect theory to empirically determine arbitrability, 
as well as mathematically to permit Nash arbitration. 
C. DRAWING HYPOTHESES FROM THE THEORY 
This thesis’s first hypothesis (Applicability) posits that disputes are most 
arbitrable when both parties are in the domain of gains. Prospect theory predicts 
each party will be risk adverse in this situation. It can be inferred that 
bargaining/arbitration is a more likely course than conflict escalation. As such, 
the resolution model presented in Chapter III attempts, where possible, to 
provide a positive framing of the conflict to each party in order to increase the 
                                            
93 Solutions utilizing security positions as the status quo (vice threat strategies) are 
sometimes referenced as “Shapley’s solutions” or “Shapley’s procedure,” although they are 
based on Nash’s four axioms.  This thesis will refer to the axiomatic process as ‘Nash arbitration,’ 
regardless of status quo determination. 
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likelihood of an arbitrated solution. While an arbitration scheme can still be 
utilized to present a solution if one or more belligerents are in a domain of losses, 
it may be only an academic exercise, as the dissatisfied nation(s) may prefer 
resolution by other means (e.g., war).   
The second hypothesis (Acceptability) suggests that the acceptability of 
Nash arbitration increases if each party is in a gains frame. This is due to the 
parity of the perceived gains of arbitration; one belligerent is not being taken 
advantage of. While acceptability should be inherent within Nash’s axiomatic 
scheme (assuming both parties are cooperative and rational),94 if states are not 
framing the conflict properly, arbitrated results may not appear acceptable. 
Again, the model presented in Chapter III maximizes the framing of gains to 
increase acceptability of the arbitrated results. 
The third hypothesis of this thesis (Durability) predicts that disputes with 
conditions that produce the fewest aberrations to the game over time produce the 
longest lasting results. If the strategic positions of each player remain relatively 
constant and the negotiation space for arbitration is also relatively stable, then an 
arbitrated solution at one point in time is likely to be relevant at later dates.  
“Game changing” events would alter the strategic position the participants—thus 




                                            
94 Nash states, “Now since our solution should consist of rational expectations of gain by 
the two bargainers, … there should be an available anticipation which gives each the amount of 
satisfaction he should expect to get.”  Nash, “The Bargaining Problem,” 158. 
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A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter creates a territorial dispute resolution model utilizing prospect 
theory and Nash arbitration. To be manageable, the model abstracts the complex 
realities of conflicts into more defined and wieldy components. Analysis is then 
performed, results interpreted, and, ideally, an acceptable resolution to the 
dispute offered. The model first determines the default domain (gains or losses) 
of each party and presents alternative framing, if applicable, to increase the 
opportunity for successful arbitration. Next, a game is constructed that emulates 
the strategic position of each country within its domain. Third, an arbitrated result 
is computed utilizing Nash’s axiomatic bargaining solution. Finally, this 
mathematical solution is translated geographically for implementation and 
resolution (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4.   Dispute resolution model. 
B. DOMAIN DETERMINATION 
This thesis hypothesizes that disputes involving parties in a domain of 
gains are the most arbitrable. Determining the domain, therefore, is central to 
modeling the dispute. As prospect theory has its foundation in cognitive 
psychology, this is an empirical aspect of the model, whereas the remainder of 
the model (the arbitration scheme) will be more mathematical. Within this portion, 
the principles of prospect theory (particularly endowments, certainty, framing, 
and reference points) will help with the analysis of each party’s outlook on the 
dispute, and justify the chosen domain. 
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1. Endowments 
In analyzing a state’s view of their endowments, current territorial 
possessions, borders, and/or lines of control provide a starting point. If these 
elements have not had a consequential change for some time (i.e., a few years), 
then the current state of affairs is the status quo for purposes of the model. If, 
however, the most current situation regarding the border is a result of a recent 
seizure, war, occupation, etc., then the current cartographic situation requires 
more analysis before it can be utilized as the model’s status quo.   
Analysis for a recently changed border or territorial control considers the 
frequency of change, the size of territory exchanged, and the method of 
exchange (e.g., war, coercion, treaty), as a minimum. For example, how often 
does the territory change hands?  Is the occupation sustainable, or is it only a 
short term/seasonal expedition?  Is the country on the losing end of the recent 
exchange capable of immediately regaining the lost territory?  These sample 
questions help determine the fluidity of the dispute. If the conflict is highly fluid, 
then the current boundary is not the status quo. Instead, a status quo is created 
that grants each party the territory they consistently control, and the more fluid 
dispute area becomes a no-man’s land that cannot affect either party’s strategic 
position for purposes of the model. If neither party can maintain possession of 
the territory for a long enough period to remove fluidity from the conflict, then 
neither should have their strategic position enhanced by such a fleeting position. 
When current possessions are not factored into the model’s status quo, as 
in the example above, they are incorporated into each belligerent’s endowment in 
other ways. The most obvious is as the state’s reference point, which does not 
need to be the same as the status quo. Due to the instant endowment effect, a 
nation may use a very recent seizure of territory as their reference point. 
Alternatively, a nation may view territory that they do not control as theirs, and 
incorporate this aspiration level into their reference point (irredentist claims, for 
example). 
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While the status quo, aspiration levels, and the instant endowment effect 
may define the geographic outlines of a nation’s reference point, there is more to 
consider. The length of time territory has been controlled or, alternatively, 
coveted, and the difficulty required in gaining or maintaining that control also 
factor into a state’s endowment rationale. Hard-earned gains or long-term 
possessions are difficult to wrestle out of a country’s endowment for purposes of 
determining their prospect-theory domain. 
2. Certainty 
Perceived certainty affects the weighting function in prospect theory. 
Specifically, outcomes that are certain are overweighed compared to those that 
are merely probable. When outcomes are overweighed, expected utility is often 
violated and behaviors based upon it appear unexpected. Factors outside of a 
state’s control may affect how they view the certainty of particular events, 
complicating their decision making, and thus the modeling process. For example, 
state A may have a disputed area with an adjacent state B, and neither has 
militarized the territory. State A may view their inaction of defending the space as 
ceding it to State B, once B moves in with force. While it is not certain state B will 
ever move in and claim the disputed land (a factor outside state A’s control), 
state A nevertheless sees their inaction as a certain loss. The domain 
determination aspect of the model accommodates belligerents that have events 
they perceive as certain, as this critical to properly framing the conflict. 
3. Framing and Reference Points 
Reference dependence is the essence of prospect theory; it is the pivot 
upon which changes in preferences occur. With a full understanding of the 
theory, it is clear how a case is framed determines the reference point, and 
therefore impacts the choices made. In other words, belligerents can change 
their reference point, and therefore their strategic position and options, by looking 
at the conflict from a different viewpoint.   
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For purposes of this model, a belligerent’s default reference point is 
determined by analyzing how they can possibly frame the conflict. More 
specifically, whether the framing is positive or negative. This is accomplished by 
examining the leader’s (or leaders’) historical experience and expectations 
regarding both the dispute and other international relations, geopolitical factors, 
economic impacts, and other issues relevant to the dispute. These empirical 
answers are examined within the context of the theory in order to analyze the 
default framing of the decision maker(s).95  If the default framing is deficient for 
successful arbitration, an alternative “arbitration framing” that highlights gains is 
proposed.96  This alternative framing may place the party in a domain of gains, 
and ideally expand the negotiation set. 
Each party’s reference point is determined at different points in time within 
the conflict in order to determine how much the conflict, and therefore the 
arbitrated results, shift. This is key to determining the durability of Nash 
arbitration results. The mathematical portion of this model is conducted with each 
of the time-dependent reference points to determine how much N moves within 
the bargaining space. A stable N indicates a durable result. 
C. THE GAME 
1. Integrating Prospect Theory and Game Theory 
Game theory relies on traditional rational models, like expected utility, to 
determine the payoffs (and therefore the choices made) in the game. Prospect 
theory, however, can create significantly different results within game theory due 
to preference reversals. In this case, a state’s ordinal ranking of payoffs will differ 
from standards often used. For example, if given the option between “war” or 
                                            
95 The process may also incorporate other applicable factors that can influence a decision 
maker’s framing, such as the ‘availability heuristic,’ which may overweigh otherwise 
inconsequential factors.  See Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Availability: A Heuristic for 
Judging Frequency and Probability,” Cognitive Psychology 5 no. 2 (1973): 207–232.  Analysis 
within the model also leverages the isolation effect to present disputing parties with a gain 
whenever possible, thereby preventing the aggregation and discounting of beneficial outcomes. 
96 In accordance with the first hypothesis, Applicability.  This also implies a “new” reference 
point. 
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“peace” in a game, “war” may not be the worst outcome (as is often is with 
expected utility) for a country with reversed preferences. If payoffs are changed 
from ordinal to interval scaling, then preferences can become even more detailed 
and nuanced. 
Take, for example, the classic game of chicken, shown in standard form in 
Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5.   Game theory version of chicken with ordinal payoffs.97 
With expected utility, the game has two equilibria and either player can 
improve his or her position with a first move. The low utility of Don’t Swerve/Don’t 
Swerve (resulting in a head-on collision) should keep the game out of that 
quadrant. However, payoffs for the game of chicken can be reversed according 
to prospect theory. For example, a driver in a domain of losses is risk acceptant. 
Depending on how the situation is framed, she may feel it is better to not swerve 
and regain her reputation, then to swerve and be ridiculed. This creates the 
game in Figure 6.98 
 
Figure 6.   Chicken with changed payoffs due to preference reversal. 
                                            
97 For each outcome, the first number is the payoff to the row player, the second, to the 
column player.  The higher the number, the more preferred the outcome: 4 = best, 1 = worst. 
98 This integration of prospect theory into game theory is based upon the unpublished work 
of Frank Giordano and Gordon H. McCormick. 
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It can be seen in Figure 6 that driver A has a dominant strategy to not 
swerve. Ideally, she has communicated this to driver B in some manner, 
particularly if driver B is in a domain of gains and is risk adverse. Altering payoffs 
in a manner consistent with the utilities of prospect theory creates a useful 
model; the change in payoffs creates a change in strategic moves, which in turn 
creates a change in outcomes. This alternative to expected utility may possibly 
provide better fidelity for dispute resolution. 
2. Setting up the Game 
Real-world conflicts and disputes are enormously complex. As 
mathematician and game theorist Phillip Straffin says:  
It may be hard to say who the players are, it is usually 
impossible to delineate all the conceivable strategies 
and say what outcomes they lead to, and it is not 
easy to assign payoffs to any given outcome. The 
best we can hope to do is to build a simple game 
which models some important features of the real 
situation.99   
This model will abstract and simplify a complex territorial dispute by 
creating a two-person, non-zero-sum game. Communication between the players 
is obviously essential to an arbitrated resolution and will factor into the proposed 
solution. It is worth examining the game without communication, however, in 
order to determine the strategic strengths and weaknesses of each player. 
It is important at this point to address the transitivity of preferences. It is 
understood that prospect theory accepts intransitive preferences as a result of 
switching domains from gains to losses, or vice-versa. However, game theory 
needs transitive preferences in order to determine player’s strategies. This 
dilemma is solved by setting up a game in one domain only. That is, a game 
must specify which domain each player is in, and is applicable for that domain 
                                            
99 Straffin, Game Theory, 4.  Italics in original text. 
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only. When each player remains in their domain, their preferences are transitive. 
Meaningful payoffs can therefore be assigned.100 
3. Payoffs 
Game payoffs for a particular domain are first assigned values on an 
ordinal scale. This ranks outcomes from the most preferred to the least preferred, 
but it does not indicate the absolute or relative magnitude of the preferences. 
With ordinal scaling, dominated strategies and equilibria (if any) in the game are 
identified. 
In order to proceed to an arbitrated solution, interval scaling must replace 
ordinal scaling. This allows cardinal payoffs that represent meaningful differences 
in the preferred outcomes. For example, with ordinal scaling it can only be 
determined that outcome x is preferred to y, which is preferred to z. That is, x > y 
> z. However, with cardinal utilities, it is possible to say that x is five-times more 
desirable than y, which is twice as desirable as z. That is, 10 > 2 > 1. Here it is 
obvious that outcome x with a cardinal payoff of 10 is much more desirable to the 
player than either outcome y or z, with payoffs of 2 and 1. The latter two 
outcomes are nearly identical in their unpleasantness when compared to the 
most-preferred outcome. 
The difficult proposition of assigning each player’s payoff values is 
accomplished by analyzing their interests in the conflict. This analysis is similar to 
the previous analysis that determined each player’s framing of the conflict, and 
will contain many of the same data points. 
4. Strategic Moves 
With payoffs assigned, the game can be played, or analyzed. Calculating 
the payoff for each party’s possible decisions helps to understand their strategic 
position (i.e., strength) in the game. First moves, commitments, threats, and 
                                            
100 This idea is supported by the literature.  See Levy, “Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, 
and International Relations,” 93, for a review. 
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promises are analyzed to understand who holds the best strategic position and 
determine each player’s best moves. For example, take the following traditional 
games of chicken (translated into seizing disputed territory) in Figures 7 and 8, 
with payoffs determined by expected utility. It is assumed each player knows the 
other’s ordinal payoffs. 
 
Figure 7.   Country A makes the first move. 
 
Figure 8.   Country B makes the first move. 
 Each country has a strong incentive to seize the disputed territory first.101  
If they do, under expected utility the other country will avoid war and not attempt 
to seize the territory back, escaping the worst-case outcome of (1,1). 
However, payoffs assigned under prospect theory may not be the same as 
expected utility. Consider a game with both countries in a domain of losses. Each 
prefers to fight over the territory, so long as there is a chance to gain/maintain 
control of it. In this “prospect game theory,” it is not assumed that players know 
                                            
101 Or firmly defend the territory if they already posses it. 
 43
the other’s domain, and therefore their payoffs. As in real life, each player must 
make an educated guess, and gamble with their decision. The Falklands conflict 
serves as an example in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9.   Prospect game theory example. 
Argentina may have assumed that the United Kingdom had payoffs more 
in-line with expected utility and the traditional game of chicken, and would avoid 
conflict. However, if the United Kingdom was also in a domain of losses and their 
payoffs mirrored the Argentineans, conflict is obviously on the horizon. 
If the dynamics of the game do not permit first moves, commitments can 
generate similar results. For example, in the game of chicken (Figure 5), both 
players have an incentive to make the first move to achieve their best payoff 
(evidenced by Figures 7 and 8). However, Not Swerving is essentially not making 
a move, but maintaining the status quo of driving straight ahead. How does a 
player make the first move, if neither plan to move (swerve)?  Driver A can make 
the commitment to not swerve and communicate this to Driver B. Driver B now 
sees that Driver A has essentially made the first move by communicating his 
strategy to the other player. Once Driver B sees Driver A remove the steering 
wheel and throw it out of the car, she knows Driver A is committed to not 
swerving. Driver B now must decide, based on her payoffs, is it better to swerve 
or not? 
Threats can also change the strategic moves of a game and influence the 
outcome. Take the game in Figure 10: 
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Figure 10.   A threat vulnerable game. 
This game is solvable with an equilibrium at AD, which is also Pareto 
optimal. This outcome is reached regardless if Rose or Colin moved first or made 
commitments.102  However, due to the arrangements of payoffs, if Rose makes a 
threat to Colin she can change the moves of the game and achieve her best 
payoff. Rose can communicate to Colin, “If you choose D, then I will choose B.”  
If the threat is believed, then payoff AD is eliminated because Rose will not pick 
strategy A. Colin’s best choice between his remaining options of AC, BC, and BD 
is the payoff (4,3) at AC. This gives Rose her best payoff. Of course, it is critical 
that Colin believe Rose will carry out her threat. 
However, Rose’s threat may be difficult to believe. Why would Rose 
intentionally reduce her payoff?  Say Colin does chose strategy B, even with 
Rose’s previous threat. To carry out the threat, Rose must purposely reduce her 
payoff from 3 to 1, her least favorable outcome (while Colin is reduced from 4 to 
2). This is very difficult in games that are only played once, but in games with 
multiple iterations, Rose’s strategy has a reward at the end. It is beneficial to take 
the loss in the short term in order to modify Colin’s choice to strategy A, which is 
more beneficial to Rose in the long term (her highest payoff). Territorial conflicts 
can obviously be modeled as games with multiple iterations. While it may be 
years or decades between iterations, they are no doubt played multiple times as  
 
 
                                            
102 The players “Rose” and “Colin” are taken from Straffin, Game Theory, and help clearly 
identify the game’s players. 
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each state jockeys for position. While not every game has payoffs that are 
susceptible to threat strategies, the proposed model accounts for threats when 
applicable. 
A promise, like a threat, also alters the strategic play of a game. Take the 
classic game “prisoner’s dilemma” in Figure 11: 
 
Figure 11.   Prisoner’s dilemma, a game that benefits from a promise. 
Both Rose and Colin have dominant strategies, putting the equilibrium for 
the game at BD with a payoff of (2,2). However, this is not Pareto optimal. Both 
could do better at AC with payoff of (3,3). How, then, can each player be 
motivated to play a dominated strategy, one that could easily be taken advantage 
of by the other player, giving them their worst outcome?  A promise can move the 
players from their stable equilibrium to the Pareto optimal result: “If you chose A, 
I will choose C.” 
Again, the believability of Rose’s promise is difficult because she must 
reduce her payoff. Colin could chose strategy C because of the promise, but 
Rose could betray him and select strategy B. This would give Rose her best 
payoff and Colin his worst, a tempting finish for competitive players. Again, 
repetitive play helps this situation. Rose only needs to betray Colin once and he 
will never again fall for her promises. Within international relations, many formal 
bodies (e.g., United Nations, treaty alliances) can enforce or apply credibility to 
promises. Like threats, not all games can benefit from promises (or the 
combination of a threat with a promise). The proposed model, however, will 
accommodate promises when available. 
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5. Security Positions 
In any given game, it is possible to assume that a player will not chose a 
strategy that results in the highest payoffs to them, but rather a strategy that 
minimizes the other player’s payoffs. This type of play is particularly useful in 
games with multiple iterations and if the undercutting player has ample 
resources. For example, if Country A is rich and powerful, they may play not to 
enhance their payoff, but to reduce Country B’s payoff. If Country B does not 
have the resources to outlast Country A’s onslaught, they may stop playing the 
game altogether. With the victory, Country A can now halt their costly threatening 
strategy and reap the spoils of Country B abandoning the game (territory). With 
such a game possible, Country B has the option to play its prudential strategy. 
This strategy gives B the best payoff possible, regardless of the moves A makes 
against it. This payoff is Country B’s security level 
The proposed model incorporates security levels as possible results if 
negotiations break down. As discussed previously, not all territorial disputes have 
a clear or stable status quo. Particularly acrimonious cases may have 
belligerents employing costly threat strategies in order to improve their strategic 
position (e.g., the cost to the People’s Republic of China to garrison military 
forces on desolate islands in the South China Sea are higher than the benefits 
they receive in the short-term). 
In summary, to model a territorial dispute as a game, each party’s domain 
must first be determined via a chosen reference point. A status quo point is then 
selected based upon the fluidity of the conflict. This leads to the assignment of 
payoff values for each country’s different strategies. Payoffs are simplified to an 
ordinal scale to determine each nation’s strategic strengths regarding first moves, 
commitments, threats, and promises. After this process, ordinal values are 
replaced with cardinal payoffs and arbitration can begin. 
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D. ARBITRATION 
After a domain-incorporating game is created that emulates the strategic 
position of each country, arbitration is performed to provide each nation an 
acceptable payoff to resolve the dispute. This model uses the axiomatic 
approach of Nash’s bargaining solution. 
1. The Status Quo 
As discussed earlier, the status quo for the model is determined by one of 
two methods. For stable disputes, it is the current cartographic conditions (e.g., 
lines of control). For unstable disputes, the status quo is determined by assigning 
each nation the territory they consistently control, and transient territory is placed 
in an unclaimed, no-man’s land. Both of these status quos may be susceptible to 
threats (depending on dispute conditions) if negotiations break down. These 
threat strategies can result in a stronger strategic position within the game for 
one country. Therefore, security levels, vice the determined status quo, may be 
used in Nash arbitration for these types of disputes.   
The status quo, regardless of how it is determined, is assigned a payoff 
value of zero for each country. Gains from the status quo are assigned positive 
payoffs; losses receive negative payoffs. Security positions (unless they are also 
the status quo) receive negative payoffs, as they are losses from the status quo 
due to a credible threat. It is important to note that even though the status quo is 
assigned a payoff of zero, it may still be a costly—if not an untenable—position 
for a nation, a position that would normally correlate with a negative payoff. 
However, as prospect theory’s reference dependence requires deviations from a 
point, zero is chosen for ease of use.103 
                                            
103 The reference point for domain determination is not necessarily tied to the status quo, 
however.  Also, as an arbitrary value, the status quo may be assigned values other than zero if 
necessary.  
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2. A Cooperative Solution 
When creating and analyzing the territorial dispute game above, many 
conditions are examined: playing without communication, playing to minimize the 
other nation’s payoff, executing threats, etc. However, drawing from this thesis’s 
first two hypotheses (Applicability and Acceptability), it is assumed that nations in 
arbitration will play cooperatively and with communication. That is, they will agree 
what is a fair outcome to the dispute and implement it.   
For a hypothetical dispute, Romania (the row player) and Colombia (the 
column player) are contesting territory. Both have militarized the line of control (at 
continued great cost), and each makes a claim beyond the line of control. 
However, both countries have grown ambivalent, if not amicable, towards each 
other over the years, and they find their economic and cultural relationship 
valuable.   
With initial analysis, Romania and Colombia’s default framing of the 
dispute may not reflect their overall inter-connectedness. They may focus on 
symbolic or emotional specifics of the dispute, perhaps as a means for an 
internal political end. This could place one, or both, of the nations in a domain of 
losses with respect to the dispute. Instead of looking at the broader context of 
economic, cultural, and regional effects, the countries focus on the zero-sum 
aspect of controlling terrain. Figure 12 displays payoffs for such a perilous 
situation. 
 
Figure 12.    Hypothetical Romania-Colombia territorial dispute game (losses). 
In this game, the status quo has both countries maintaining the line of 
control and is assigned a relative payoff of (0,0). Both Romania and Colombia 
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view abandoning their claim as zero-sum.   Unilateral abandonment is also 
viewed as more costly than both open conflict and maintaining the status quo. 
This is not desirable, as both countries are risk acceptant because of their 
domain of losses. Assigned payoffs favor conflict over negotiations (and the 
possible resulting concessions). Plotting the payoffs into a polygon (Figure 13) 
shows the difficulty of the situation, as there is no Pareto-optimal move away 
from the status quo; a negotiation set does not exist. 
 
Figure 13.   Payoff polygon for Romania-Colombia game (losses). 
Framing the conflict in broader terms than zero-sum control over terrain 
has the potential to change the domain of the belligerents, and therefore their 
payoffs. With altered payoffs, peaceful alternatives may become acceptable.   
For example, an arbitrator could highlight the economic potential of the 
undeveloped, disputed terrain. Both Romania and Colombia could benefit from 
development, regardless of who controls the land. In addition, conflict over the 
disputed border may worsen other, more consequential, regional geo-strategic 
factors. A gain in territory may be a small prize for upsetting regional stability. If 
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Romania and Colombia alter their framing to incorporate other germane factors, 
they could create a domain of gains and not seek open conflict over the territory. 
Rather, they could pursue arbitration with the hopes of reducing the costs of 
maintaining the disputed line of control.104   
Take the game in Figure 14, a dispute with Romania and Colombia now in 
a domain of gains: 
 
Figure 14.   Hypothetical Romania-Colombia territorial dispute game (gains). 
In this game, both countries are risk adverse because of their domain. 
With successful arbitration more likely, the dispute is further analyzed.   
The status quo has both countries maintaining the stable line of control 
and is assigned a relative payoff of (0,0). Comparatively speaking, it is more 
difficult and costly for Romania to maintain the dispute than it is for Colombia, as 
reflected within each country’s cardinal payoffs.105  Both countries can receive 
their highest payoff of if they seize without contest. However, if one seizes, the 
other country may seize as well, not a desirable prospect for a risk-adverse 
country.   
To analyze first moves, commitments, threats, and promises, cardinal 
payoffs are simplified to an ordinal scale, producing the game in Figure 15.   
                                            
104 This example is, of course, overly simplistic, but serves to highlight the importance and 
dynamic nature of framing. 
105 This is determined by analyzing the payoff ratios within each country’s scheme, not by 
‘interpersonal’ comparison of utilities, which is meaningless (i.e., Romania does not value a 10 
the same as Colombia values a 10).  The ratio of payoffs to the status quo shows that events 
(e.g., conflict, maintaining the border) are generally costlier for Romania. 
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Figure 15.   Ordinal scaling for Romania-Colombia game. 
From the ordinal scale game, a movement matrix for each country 
determines dominated strategies and equilibriums, if any (Figure 16). 
 
Figure 16.   Movement diagram for Romania-Colombia game 
Neither country has a dominant strategy. While there are two equilibria, 
they are non-equivalent and non-interchangeable due to the non-zero-sum 
nature of the game. If both players try for their favored equilibrium 
(simultaneously and without communication), they will end up at Seize/Seize, the 
least desired outcome for both. 
Both countries do have a first move available: seizing the territory. This 
ideally results in the other country abandoning their claim. However, as described 
previously, integrating prospect theory creates ambiguity for the seizing country 
in this situation. Is the other country in a domain of losses and willing to fight?  If 
the seizing country is in a domain of gains, they will likely avoid the risk of conflict 
and choose not to seize, despite their first-move advantage. 
The same context is true for the threat available to each country (i.e., “If 
you seize, I will seize”). If the threat is communicated and believed, the 
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threatening country could receive its highest payoff, with the other country 
abandoning its claim. However, a country in a domain of gains is not likely to 
threaten the other nation; if the threat recipient is in a domain of losses, the risk 
of conflict escalates (refer to Figure 6). A risk-adverse nation, therefore, should 
not issue the threat. 
If both countries play their conservative “maximin” strategy, they end up at 
Abandon/Abandon with a payoff of (1,1).106  While not their highest payoff, it is 
better than the status quo, as they are relieved of the costs of maintaining the 
dispute. Conservative play fits nicely if both nations are risk adverse, but surely 
they could increase their payoff if they communicated, instead of both unilaterally 
abandoning their claims outright. Arbitration is a logical solution to this dispute. 
a. Graphical Nash Solution 
The possible outcomes to the dispute are graphically represented 
by constructing a payoff polygon107  (Figure 17). 
 
Figure 17.   Payoff polygon for Romania-Colombia game. 
                                            
106 This is also the same outcome if both a threat and promise are used in combination.   
107 Which provides visual proof that the countries can to better than their mutual 
abandonment position at (2,1). 
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From the bounded and convex payoff polygon, a triangle is drawn 
from the status quo point to the Pareto optimal line [(-3,10) to (8,-4)]. This 
ensures each country will do no worse than the status quo by bounding the 
Pareto optimal outcomes. This defines the negotiation set (Figure 18). 
 
Figure 18.   Negotiation set for Romania-Colombia game. 
Within the negotiation set lies the point N, which both countries 
should find as a satisfying payoff to resolve their dispute. It is found graphically 
by halving the x- and y-axis of the negotiation triangle. The corresponding 
intersection on the Pareto optimal line is Nash’s axiomatic solution (Figure 19). 
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Figure 19.   Graphical Nash solution for Romania-Colombia game. 
It is graphically determined that N is (2.4, 3.1). Each country should 
be satisfied with their payoff: it is better than maintaining the status quo at (0,0), 
and also provides a better solution then conservative play at (2,1). 
b. Algebraic Nash Solution 
The Nash point is calculated algebraically using Equation (4): 
 
(4) (Xo + a/2|m|, Yo + a/2) 
 
Where (Xo,Yo) is the “status quo,”108 a is the height of the Nash 
triangle, and m is the slope of the Pareto optimal line. Both a and m must be 
determined before Equation (4) can be completed. 
The equation for the Pareto optimal line from point (-3,10) to (8,-4) 
is y = mx + b, where b is the y-intercept. Then, 
m = (Y2–Y1)/(X2–X1) = (-4–10)/(8– -3) = -1.27 
                                            
108 Using the standard terms of Nash arbitration.  It may actually be the threat positions of 




b = Y1–mX1 = 10 – -1.27(-3) = 6.18 
 
Therefore, the Pareto optimal line is: 
  
y = -1.27x + 6.18 
 
Next is the calculation for the height of the Nash triangle, a, which is 
the y-value difference between the intersection of the Pareto optimal line at Xo 
and Yo. It is straightforward in this example, as (0,0) is utilized as the “status quo.”  
However, for disputes that do not use the current status quo for arbitration (e.g., 
a threat position if negotiations break down), the process is as follows: 
Let Yi be the y-value of the Pareto intercept of Xo. Then, 
Yi = mXo + b = -1.27(0) + 6.18 = 6.18 
 
Since, 
Yi – Yo = a 
 
Then, 
a = 6.18 
 
With a and m determined, substitution into Equation (4) produces 
the Nash point: 
XNash = Xo + a/2|m| = 0 + 6.18/2(1.27) = 2.43 
YNash = Yo + a/2 = 0 + 6.18/2 = 3.09 
 
Therefore, 
N = (2.43, 3.09) 
 
E. GEOGRAPHIC IMPLEMENTATION 
The result of Nash arbitration provides each nation with a payoff value 
they should deem fair. However, translating a payoff integer into territory is a 
difficult process. The difficulty is further compounded because the game is not 
zero-sum. It is possible, in fact likely, for both countries to gain from the status 
quo. How is territory divided if both are rewarded with gains? 
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It is worth noting again that the payoff values incorporate more than just 
physical control over terrain. Framing the conflict not only influenced a nation’s 
domain, it also parsed out the interwoven components of the conflict that are 
mitigated with a peaceful resolution (e.g., the economic and military costs of not 
maintaining a militarized border). The Romania-Colombia example reflects this, 
as both countries view the prospect of abandoning the claim outright as more 
valuable than maintaining the costly dispute. While this seemingly abnormal 
situation is likely only in a domain of gains, it demonstrates that payoff values are 
not concretely tied to territorial control. 
Because the Nash point may lie somewhere between two pure strategy 
solutions, it can be defined as a percentage of either strategy. In the Romania-
Colombia example, the solution N lies somewhere between Romania 
Abandon/Colombia Seize and Romania Seize/Colombia Abandon. This ratio 
begins to draw a line in the sand that will demarcate the Romanian-Colombian 
border.   
The frequency of Romania Abandon/Colombia Seize can be determined 




Where, XRA/CS is Romania’s value if they abandon and Colombia seizes, 
and XRS/CA is Romania’s value if they seize and Colombia abandons. Therefore, 
1–(|2.43– -3|/|-3–8|) = 1–(5.43/11) = 50.64% 
That is, the Romania Abandon/Colombia Seize strategy should be played 
50.64 percent of the time, and Romania Seize/Colombia Abandon the remaining 
49.36 percent to achieve the arbitrated payoff N. In this example, Colombia 
would be awarded slightly over half of the total territory in dispute.109 
                                            
109 Recall that Colombia had a stronger strategic position within the dispute.  Awarding them 
more land (although practically negligible in this example) reflects that. 
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If the territory in dispute is not homogeneous and has some areas more 
inherently valuable than others, it would not be wise to simply divide the area of 
the disputed territory in half (or whatever the resulting ratio is). Rather, it is the 
value of the territory that should be split. The value can be determined multiple 
ways. As one example, the terrain can be subdivided by land use/type and each 
country can assign a value (utility) per area for each land type. A modified 
adjusted-winner procedure can be performed, which uses the pure strategy 
solution ratio determined above as the “equitable” point in the procedure.110 
F. MODEL SUMMARY AND HYPOTHESIS INTEGRATION 
This chapter presents a territorial dispute resolution model that first 
integrates prospect theory (specifically, domain determination) into game theory. 
Second, it utilizes Nash arbitration to compute a fair result, and, finally, outlines 
how a numerical Nash solution is implemented geographically. Each of these 
steps is useful for testing the hypotheses presented in this thesis. 
The first hypothesis seeks the applicability of the resolution model. It 
states that territorial disputes are most arbitrable when both states are in a 
domain of gains, and less arbitrable when either or both are in a domain of 
losses. Determining a country’s domain and then allocating their payoffs tests 
this hypothesis. If one, or both, countries are in a domain of losses (risk seeking) 
and the payoffs do not provide arbitration with the greatest utility,111 then the 
hypothesis is supported. Also, if both countries are in a domain of gains and the 
payoff schemes support cooperation and arbitration, the hypothesis is further 
confirmed. 
                                            
110 Cases where the Nash determined land division is not equal (e.g., 25%:75%) would 
obviously not be “envy free” or “equitable” within the adjusted winner procedure—but that is not 
required.  Arbitration has already resolved these points, and the adjusted winner procedure is 
simply dividing the “pie” in a way that does not require inter-personal utility comparisons. For 
more on the adjusted winner procedure, see Steven J. Brams and Alan D. Taylor, Fair Division: 
From Cake-Cutting to Dispute Resolution (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
111 This is feasible, as risk-seeking countries will likely have dominant strategies or first 
moves that are more advantages than an arbitrated payoff.  Game play will demonstrate the 
country would be better off accepting risk, avoiding cooperation, and going for higher payoffs. 
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The second hypothesis seeks to establish the acceptability of arbitration. It 
states that if both states are in a domain of gains, the acceptability of Nash 
arbitration in territorial disputes increases. This is a natural conclusion from the 
first hypothesis and inherent within Nash’s scheme. By maintaining a domain of 
gains, a country is likely to arbitrate to avoid conflict. This same perspective also 
leads to a perceived parity of gains from Nash’s bargaining solution: both 
countries are better off than they would be in non-cooperative play, strategic 
positions are considered (via the chosen “status quo” point), and the solution is 
Pareto optimal. Neither country could do better unilaterally. Countries that do not 
find the solution N fair are likely not candidates for arbitration in the first place. 
The final hypothesis seeks to determine the durability of the model. It 
states that Nash arbitration is most durable when dynamic dispute conditions 
generate fewer aberrations to results over time. Applying the model to various 
time periods within the conflict tests this hypothesis. If the conflict is relatively 
stable, each game created will likely have similar payoffs, therefore negotiations 
sets and solutions. The point N determined today should then be a durable 
solution. However, if a conflict is highly dynamic over the period, the countries 
will probably have changing strategic positions and strengths throughout the 
dispute. This will result in games with payoffs that produce a greater variety of 
negotiation sets. The solution N determined under present conditions may not 
reflect an enduring solution. 
The next chapter will present an in-depth case study and apply the model 
to the dispute. To further test the hypotheses, Appendix A has an additional case 
study vignette with solution. 
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IV. KURIL ISLANDS CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Russia and Japan have not signed a peace treaty to conclude World  
War II, due in large measure to a dispute over the Southern Kuril Islands.112  
Russia maintains control of the islands since seizing them at the end of the war, 
while Japan has irredentist claims that the islands have always been Japanese. 
The now intractable territorial dispute is more of an emotional symbol of Russo-
Japanese relations writ large than a rational negotiation over remote, bleak 
terrain. Finding a peaceful, arbitrated resolution to this conflict would benefit 
many Pacific nations, and greatly improve Russo-Japanese relations. 
This chapter begins with a brief summary of the Kuril Islands: their 
geography, pre-dispute history, and importance. Next, the dispute history is 
broken into pertinent time periods from 1855 to today. The history section informs 
the analysis on Russian and Japanese decision making, both their framing and 
their domain. Finally, the arbitration model is applied. A game is created that 
simulates today’s strategic conditions and a geographic solution to the dispute 
offered, which grants Japan control of the Southern Kurils. Analysis of the 
durability of this Nash solution (compared to previous hypothetical results) 
finishes the chapter.  
1. Geography 
The Kuril Island chain stretches 740 miles northeast from the Japanese 
home island of Hokkaido to the southern tip of Russian Kamchatka (Figure 20). 
The arc of thirty-six islands and innumerable islets divides the Sea of Okhotsk to 
the west from the Pacific Ocean to the east.   
 
                                            
112 Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Between War and Peace, 1697–1985, vol. 1 of The Northern 




Figure 20.   Kuril Islands chain with previous divisions.113 
                                            
113 Map by author.  Maps optimized for black and white printing are in Appendix B. 
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The Kurils have an area of 6,000 square miles, about half of which is on 
the four largest islands (two of which are in the Southern Kurils): Iturup (Etorofu), 
Kunashir (Kunashiri), Urup, and Paramushir.114  In relation to more familiar 
islands, the Kurils are slightly smaller than the Hawaiian Islands, and Iturup is 
twice the size of Okinawa. The islands are on a very active portion of the Pacific 
“ring of fire,” with frequent earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. Weather and 
waves are also dangerous. Narrow channels and tides generate thirty-five foot 
“super waves,” tsunamis threaten coastal development, and the confluence of 
warm and cold, in both the air and sea, creates unstable and violent 
meteorological and oceanic conditions. 
The neatly arrayed arc of volcanic islands appears as if stepping-stones 
connecting the two Asian powers. The islands have a frontier quality to both 
Russia and Japan; they have never been fully developed. While nearly the “end 
of the world”115 for continental Russia, the islands have a close proximity to the 
Japanese home islands. The proximity is mostly geographic, however, as the 
small islands were difficult to access for centuries and they remain somewhat 
culturally and psychologically distant. The Kurils, despite their relative 
remoteness, define the meeting point between the Russian and Japanese 
people. Today, the chain marks “the intersection of Russian, Japanese, and 
American power spheres in the North Pacific.”116 
2. Pre-dispute History 
The native people of the Kuril Islands are the Ainu, although other cultures 
likely preceded them.117  Japanese and Europeans first contacted aboriginal 
Ainu on the Kurils in the seventeenth century. Ainu in the Northern Kurils 
                                            
114 John J. Stephan, The Kuril Islands: Russo-Japanese Frontier in the Pacific (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1974), 1.  Note: Russian island names are used.  Japanese names, when 
applicable, are parenthesized when first mentioned. 
115 Semion Shurtakov, “Na Krai Sveta,” Ogoniok 40 no. 13 (March 1962), 12. 
116 Stephan, The Kuril Islands, 1. 
117 The Ainu ranged over the Kuril Islands, Hokkaido, and the now Russian island of 
Sakhalin. 
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developed distinctly from their cousins in the South. The southern Ainu were 
more connected to Ainu peoples on Hokkaido, and much of their history is 
interwoven.    Differences between Northern and Southern Ainu became more 
pronounced as Japan and Russia intruded into the Kurils. 
In 1638, Shogun Tokugawa banned foreigners from the shores of Japan, 
“closing” the country. Foreign contact was minimal for over 200 years until Japan 
was “opened” in the mid-nineteenth century, generally attributed to Commodore 
Matthew Perry. The American and British interests in Japan were generally trade 
focused. Russia’s principle interests, however, were first to define its border with 
its neighbor, and then to counter the growing influence of Europeans and 
Americans in the Far East. 
Russians had been exploring the Kurils since the early eighteenth century, 
nearly the same time the Japanese were advancing north, and the border was 
mutually unclear. Each was probing the islands to determine the depth of the 
other’s advance up and down the chain.118  These explorations led to a more 
accurate understanding of the Kuril Islands, but no definitive claims of discovery 
or ownership. As historian John Stephan summarizes,  
Ultimately, the honour of discovering and exploring the Kuril Islands 
must be shared by several nations. The Japanese first wrote about 
the archipelago’s existence. A Dutchman put some of the islands 
on a map. The Russians ascertained the arc’s length and breadth 
and gave it a reasonably accurate cartography. An acerbic 
Frenchman saddled the chain with an unsavory reputation.119 
However, by the end of the eighteenth century, a de facto boundary 
between Russia and Japan existed between the islands of Iturup and Urup.120  In 
                                            
118 Stephan, The Kuril Islands, 36–56. 
119 Stephan, The Kuril Islands, 56. 
120 Gregory L. Morris, “Japan, Russia and the ‘Northern Territories’ Dispute: Neighbors in 
Search of a Good Fence” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2002). 
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1821, Russian Emperor Alexander I unilaterally decreed Russian territorial 
waters as north of the southernmost tip of Urup.121   
After the opening of Japan, Russian Admiral Yevfimy Putyatin went to 
Japan in 1853 to settle the boundary and open diplomatic and commercial 
relations. Negotiations were difficult, with both Russia and Japan claiming the 
entire Kuril chain. Eventually a compromise was reached in the 1855 Shimoda 
Treaty that formalized the first border; Russia occupied Urup, Japan occupied 
Iturup, and the border divided the channel between the two islands.122  This is 
the first and last time Russia and Japan negotiated their Kuril border as relatively 
equal powers in peace.123 
3. Importance 
The volcanic islands in and of themselves hold little value. Timber and 
minerals do not present themselves in enough abundance to be economically 
viable and agriculture is virtually non-existent. The remoteness and difficult living 
conditions keep settled populations small, with little infrastructure and minimal 
industry. 
Offshore, however, the islands are a bounty. The mixing of warm currents 
from the Sea of Japan with frigid North Pacific currents creates a productive and 
diversified fishery. The rocky island coasts also shelter dense kelp and seaweed 
forests. Virtually all economic activity within the Kurils is directly or indirectly 
related to the fishing industry, although eco-tourism holds promise if 
developed.124 
                                            
121 Stephan, The Kuril Islands, 60. 
122 Hasegawa, Between War and Peace, 24–25. 
123 Interestingly, Morris points out, “[T]he border demarcation between Russia and Japan 
marked Japan’s formal acceptance of the Western system of nation-states with political 
boundaries.  Being an island people, the Japanese hitherto had seen no need to define their 
borders until the Russians forced them to.”  Morris, “The ‘Northern Territories’ Dispute,” 12. 
124 Hasegawa, Between War and Peace, 7. 
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Additionally, each island serves as an anchor for a 200-nautical-mile 
exclusive economic zone encompassing the surrounding waters. The 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea codifies the zones, granting 
each state special rights over the exploration and use of marine resources.125  
This makes each island individually valuable, and serves as the foundation for 
economic arguments over control of the islands. 
Geo-strategically, the Kurils have historically been vitally important, 
although their significance has waned. In 1941, Japan controlled the entire Kuril 
chain and launched the Pearl Harbor attack from sheltered Hitokappu Bay on 
Iturup’s Pacific coast. The imperial fleet was able to rendezvous and sail 
undetected out of the sea lanes from its Kuril launch point. The islands were also 
the last line of defense from a northern allied attack on the Japanese home 
islands. 
After the war, the Soviet Union seized and controlled the entire island 
chain. It first served as a line of defense for Siberia, and later for preventing 
American intrusion into the Sea of Okhotsk, where the Soviets maintained a 
ballistic missile submarine “bastion” capable of launching a retaliatory nuclear 
strike.126  American occupied Japan presented the Soviet Union with a 
substantial threat on their Far East border, a fact Nikita Khrushchev recalled in 
his memoirs:  “It would have been sheer folly to relinquish the islands to Japan 
when the country was essentially under American occupation. We figured the 
minute we gave Japan the two islands, the United States would turn them into  
 
 
                                            
125 Third United Nations Conference on Law of the Sea, “United Nations Convention on Law 
of the Sea,” December 10, 1982, 43–53, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/ 
texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf. 
126 Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Neither War nor Peace, 1985-1998, vol. 2 of The Northern 
Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1998), 530. 
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military bases.”127  The Kurils were of vital strategic importance to the Soviet 
Union as Soviet-Japanese relations were essentially viewed as Soviet-American 
relations.128 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the Kuril Islands have lost much of their 
strategic importance. Russia does not face invasion of its east from Japan or the 
United States, and there is little need to defend the Sea of Okhotsk as an 
impenetrable fortress. However, the islands remain the seam of American-
Russian-Japanese power, and geo-strategic potential will always exist in this 
environment. 
B. DISPUTE BACKGROUND 
As frontier borderlands for both Russia and Japan, the Kurils have rarely 
been anything but an ambiguous or contested border. The Shimoda Treaty in 
1855 and the Treaty of St. Petersburg in 1875 are the only time ownership of the 
chain was clearly and incontestably defined under peaceful means. The 
conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, and World War II in 1945, also 
saw Japan and Russia exchange lands, but much more acrimoniously. 
Possession of the Kurils has not changed since September 1945. This section 
will first condense the voluminous record of Russo-Soviet interactions over the 
Kuril Islands, and then define the current status quo.129 
1. Previous Losses and Gains 
a. Treaties of Shimoda and St. Petersburg–1855 and 1875 
Japan and Russia defined their Kuril border for the first time with 
the Shimoda Treaty in 1855: 
                                            
127 Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes, trans. and ed. Jerrold 
L. Schecter (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1990), 89. 
128 Morris, “The ‘Northern Territories’ Dispute,” 31. 
129 For the sake of brevity, many events—some significant—must only be scarcely 
mentioned, if at all.  For a complete and objective record, see the works of Tsuyoshi Hasegawa. 
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Henceforth the frontier between Japan and Russia will run between 
the islands of Iturup and Urup. The entire island of Iturup belongs to 
Japan and the entire island of Urup, as well as the other Kuril 
Islands to the north of that island, belong to Russia. As for the 
island of Karafuto (Sakhalin), it remains heretofore undivided 
between Japan and Russia.130 
In addition to defining the Kuril border, the treaty also started 
Russo-Japanese diplomatic relations and opened three Japanese ports to trade. 
However, the Shimoda Treaty did not find a resolution demarcating a Russian-
Japanese border on the island of Sakhalin, to the west of the Kurils. Russians 
were living on the north of the island, and Japanese had occupied the south. 
The ambiguous Sakhalin situation was unpleasant to both. Japan 
interpreted that Russians would not move south, where the Japanese had 
influence, but Russia took the lack of division to mean they were free to move 
across the island.131  Sakhalin was important to Russia as the entryway to the 
Amur River basin (defining the boundary between Russia and Manchuria), as 
well as providing Russian access to the Sea of Japan via La Perouse Straight, 
between Sakhalin and the Japanese home island of Hokkaido. 
By 1867, a weakened Japanese shogunate was forced to accept 
Russia’s right to move into southern Sakhalin with the Provisional Rule on Joint 
Residence. In 1868, the shogunate was overthrown and replaced by the Meiji 
government, which did not recognize the Provisional Rule. The new government, 
however, was in a poor position to challenge Russia. Conflict could mean not 
only the loss of Sakhalin, but Hokkaido as well.132  Japan made concessions, 
and the Treaty of St. Petersburg in 1875 granted all of Sakhalin to Russia in 
exchange for the remainder of the Kuril chain. Japan now controlled all the 
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islands from Hokkaido to the Russian peninsula of Kamchatka. It would maintain 
complete control of the Kurils for the next seventy years, until 1945. 
b. Russo-Japanese War–1905  
Although Japan was in a relatively weak position regarding the 
Russians in 1875, by “1890 Japan was an emerging imperialist country preparing 
to subjugate weak neighbors.”133  With aims at China and Korea, Japanese 
interests were clashing with Russian. Tensions climaxed with the Russo-
Japanese War, starting in 1904. Japan defeated Russia, culminated by the 
annihilation of the Russian Baltic fleet in the Tsushima Straights in 1905. In the 
peace terms, Russia granted the entire island of Sakhalin to the Japanese. 
Ownership of the Kurils did not change, as Japan already controlled the entire 
arc, but it is important to note the war “left an indelible sense of humiliation on the 
Russian consciousness.”134  While the next decades saw periods of peace—and 
even alliances—between Russia and Japan, they were not without suspicion and 
caution. The Kurils would continue to simmer. 
c. World War II–1945  
During World War II, Soviet aspirations for the Kurils were clear. 
The Soviet Union first requested the entire chain as the price for a non-
aggression pact with Japan in 1940; at the time, Japan was in a position to 
decline. Joseph Stalin approved of the 1943 Cairo Declaration, which, among 
other things, stated, “Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which 
she has taken with violence and greed.”135  Although Japanese control of the 
Kuril chain does not technically fall into this category, the declaration clearly 
showed Stalin that the Americans and British were willing to transfer sovereignty 
of Japanese held islands. More importantly, President Roosevelt was likely 
unclear on the history of the Kurils, mistakenly believing they were a Russo-
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Japanese war conquest, not an issue settled diplomatically in 1875. Stalin did not 
correct the misinterpretation, and conflated the Kurils and Sakhalin as land that 
was “taken from my country.”136 
By the Yalta conference in 1945, President Roosevelt should have 
been better informed, as a State Department memo drafted to prepare the 
President specifically focused on the post-war division of the Kuril chain. 
Specifically, it stated that Japan has the strongest claim on the southern group of 
islands, in large part due to indisputable “historic possession,” while the Soviet 
Union has a strong claim on the northern group of islands.137  However, by the 
conclusion of the Yalta conference in February 1945, Stalin was assured the 
Kuril Islands would be “handed over” as a condition of Soviet entrance into the 
war with Japan.138 
World War II in the Pacific ended on the Kurils Islands, as the 
Soviets started their invasion on August 17th—days after the announced 
Japanese surrender. Operations were not concluded until September 4th, when 
the entire chain was occupied.139  Japanese living on the islands were evacuated 
to Hokkaido, and annexation as Soviet territory was complete by 1947. 
d.  Treaty of San Francisco–1951  
The 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan (also known as the Treaty of 
San Francisco) formally ended the war between Japan and the Allies. In the 
treaty: 
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Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kuril Islands, and 
that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which 
Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of 
Portsmouth of September 5, 1905.140 
In the Japanese text, the Kuril Islands are referred to as Chishima 
Retto, which to the Japanese always conceptually included both Iturup and 
Kunashir. Fully understanding the territorial history of the Kurils and their 
continuous control of the southern islands, the Japanese delegation to San 
Francisco did not believe that the southern islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, 
and the Habomai group141 were part of the Kuril Islands being ceded away. They 
lodged a delicate protest with the American representative John F. Dulles on the 
wording of the treaty. Unbending on the verbiage, Dulles informed the Japanese 
they could make their claim known during a speech to the convention, which 
chief Japanese delegate Shigeru Yoshida did: 
With respect to the Kuriles and South Sakhalin, I cannot yield to the 
claims of the Soviet Delegate that Japan had grabbed them by 
aggression. At the time of the opening of Japan, her ownership of 
the two islands of Etorofu [Iturup] and Kunashiri [Kunashir] of the 
South Kuriles was not questioned at all by the Czarist 
government…  Even the islands of Habomai and Shikotan, 
constituting part of Hokkaido, one of Japan’s main islands, are still 
being occupied by Soviet forces…142 
It is during the San Francisco peace conference that the United 
States’ role in the Kuril dispute becomes more than that of an innocuous third 
party. A scholar on Russo-Japanese relations and the Kuril dispute, Tsuyoshi 
Hasegawa argues that Dulles intentionally muddied the waters on which islands 
constituted “Kuril Islands.” Dulles stated: 
Some question has been raised as to whether the geographical 
name “Kuril Islands” mentioned in Article 2 (c) includes the 
Habomai Islands. It is the view of the United States that it does not. 
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If, however, there were a dispute about this, it could be referred to 
the International Court of Justice under Article 22.143 
Hasegawa notes Dulles mentions only the Habomai island group, 
leaving out the larger islands of Iturup, Kunashir, and Shikotan that Japan claims 
has always been Japanese territory and never previously exchanged. Hasegawa 
argues, “Dulles’s major objective was to keep the geographical definition of the 
Kuril ambiguous so as to make sure that this would become a long-lasting 
conflict between the Soviet Union and Japan.”144  With Cold War battle lines 
being drawn, Foster intended to keep Japan in the American sphere of influence, 
granting the United States significant power in the Far East. This tactic also 
focused Japanese irredentism to the north, away from the south where the 
United States wanted to maintain control of Okinawa.145  Dulles’s posturing non-
withstanding, Hasegawa notes, “As long as Japan accepts the terms of the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty, it is not entitled to Kunashiri [Kunashir] and Etorofu 
[Iturup].”146 
The Soviet Union had reservations about the Treaty of San 
Francisco and did not sign the accord.147  By not signing the treaty, the Soviet 
Union forfeited “the opportunity to acquire unquestioned title” to the Kuril Islands, 
essentially placing them in “international limbo.”148  To the Soviets, however, 
their de facto control was anything but. They had gained the islands as a result of 
victory over vanquished Japan. Regardless of Japanese claims that the Southern 
Kurils were not part of the Kuril chain and had always been Japanese islands, 
the Russians had invaded, occupied, and annexed the lands during war, 
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therefore rightfully claiming them. It was acquisition of territory through conquest, 
something the Soviets did worldwide during the war. 
e. Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration–1956  
It is likely that the Soviets soon realized their strategic failure in San 
Francisco, particularly after Stalin’s death in 1953. Changes were also taking 
place in Japan, with a new prime minister and ideas of a more independent 
foreign policy. The first round of negotiations between Russia and Japan to 
resolve their diplomatic impasse took place in 1955. The chief negotiator for the 
Japanese, Shun’ichi Matsumoto, was provided instructions that contained the 
“return of Habomai and Shikotan, the Kurils, and southern Sakhalin.”149  
Supplementary instructions prioritized the effort: first, Habomai and Shikotan; 
second, the Southern Kurils (Kunashir and Iturup); and third, the Northern Kurils 
and Sakhalin. Notably, the return of Habomai and Shikotan was considered 
sufficient for a treaty.150   
The Soviet negotiator, Yakov Malik, at one point made overtures of 
returning Habomai and Shikotan with the consent that the American-Japanese 
security treaty was not directed at a third country.151  For a brief period, a 
resolution to the Kuril dispute and a peace treaty between Japan and the Soviet 
Union looked possible. However, both Japan and the Soviet Union were 
undergoing internal power shifts during this time, which affected their positions 
during negotiations. Upon consulting Tokyo for final instructions before 
concluding a treaty, Matsumoto was informed that Habomai and Shikotan were 
no longer sufficient—all four islands of the Southern Kurils must be returned.   
Even more impactful, perhaps, was American influence over the 
Japanese. The United States had strong interests in Japan. As Hasegawa 
summarizes: 
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It was with apprehension that the United States watched Soviet 
overtures to Japan… There were two matters that [the U.S.] had to 
avoid at all costs. First, if a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty were to 
resolve the territorial dispute between the countries, Japanese 
nationalism might be channeled into a demand for the return of 
Okinawa. Moreover, this nationalism might be directed at the 
withdrawal of the American military presence in Japan… a severe 
blow to U.S. global strategy.152 
Final negotiations took place in Moscow during the summer of 
1956. Many issues between Japan and Russia had been settled, but the 
territorial dispute remained. Any hope of resolving it was crushed after U.S. 
Secretary of State Dulles intervened—the so called “Dulles intimidation:” 
The Japanese might tell the Soviets that if they were forced to give 
up the Kuriles they would have to give up the Ryukyus as well. In 
its dealings with Japan the United States has been soft where the 
Soviet Union has been tough. Perhaps the United States should 
likewise get tough… If the Soviet Union were to take all the Kuriles, 
the United States might remain forever in Okinawa, and no 
Japanese government could survive. 153 
Dulles made it clear that it was unacceptable to the U.S. for Japan 
to remove its claim on all the Southern Kurils. Accepting the return of only 
Habomai and Shikotan would essentially release any Japanese claim to 
Okinawa. Japan was used a pawn in the Cold War American-Soviet chess 
match. The Soviets were essentially doing the same to Japan as well, remaining 
steadfast in not returning any islands so long as Americans controlled Okinawa. 
Ultimately, negotiations failed to produce a peace treaty. The 
Soviets maintained the viewpoint that they were the victor of WWII and a peace 
treaty should reflect this. The Japanese, however, wished to correct the wrongs 
of the Soviets.154  In spite of this, the Japanese and Soviets did sign a joint 
declaration and the end of negotiations in October 1956. The declaration ended 
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the state of war and normalized relations, including the return of prisoners of war. 
Russia also committed itself to the return of the Habomai islets and Shikotan: 
[T]he Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, desiring to meet the 
wishes of Japan and taking into consideration the interests of the 
Japanese State, agrees to transfer to Japan the Habomai Islands 
and the island of Shikotan, the actual transfer of these islands to 
Japan to take place after the conclusion of a Peace Treaty between 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan.155 
After the United States and Japan signed a revised security treaty 
in 1960, Soviet Primer Khrushchev modified the goodwill the Soviets displayed 
four years previous, attaching the stipulation that Habomai and Shikotan would 
only be returned after a signed peace treaty and “all foreign troops are 
withdrawn.”156  Japan immediately rejected the unilateral approach to modifying 
the signed and ratified Joint Declaration, and the Soviet change has no binding 
legal status.  
f. Previous Losses and Gains Summary and Analysis 
 Both Russia and Japan have controlled the entire Kuril chain 
(every island from Hokkaido to Kamchatka) at some point in time, making 
sovereignty claims interwoven.157  The first division of the islands in 1855 still 
makes logical sense today—it appears on the surface as the limits of both Russia 
and Japan’s traditional influence. Japan’s control of the entire chain in 1875 
actually came from a position of weakness, as it gave up the more valuable 
island of Sakhalin. With the conclusion of The Russo-Japanese war in 1905, 
relations were at an all-time low. While the Kuril Islands themselves did not trade 
hands, negative stereotypes on both sides were reinforced, and many remain to 
this day.158  Acting on resentment and sound geo-strategic ideas, the Soviet 
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Union seized the entire chain even after the Japanese formally surrendered in 
World War II. The Japanese took the Soviet seizure of their “inherent homeland” 
after the surrender as a wrong, and their new ally, the United States, did little to 
right it. Rather, the U.S. incubated the dispute as part of Cold War geo-politics. 
Japanese-Russian negotiations over the past five decades have 
failed to significantly advance the dispute beyond the 1956 Joint Declaration. 
Talks had potential in the early 1990s as Russia sought to redefine itself post-
Cold War, however, neither nation could move past the symbolic meanings 
attached to the islands, and negotiations faltered. This is due to both internal and 
external factors.   
For Japan, periods of internal political change create episodes 
where nationalism comes to the fore. This feeds the sense of loss felt by the 
Japanese and negotiations are therefore more difficult. During less internally-
emotive times (e.g., when Japan sought to conclude the dispute in 1956), the 
United States sabotaged the Japanese effort during the Cold War. Coercion to 
meet American policies limited the negotiation set of the Japanese, and 
successful negotiations were not possible, regardless of their domain. 
For the Russians, internal nationalism comes into play as well. 
Shikotan and Habomai were initially seen as bargaining chips by the Soviets, but 
the duration and ensuing intractability of the dispute has made these minor, and 
traditionally Japanese, islands feel more “Russian.”  Their role as bargaining 
chips has severely lessened. Externally, Russia had to view its Kuril dispute 
nearly as a dispute with the United States, as any Japanese gain during the Cold 
War was essentially an American gain. While internal nationalism and politics for 
both Japan and Russia will continue to influence the ability to negotiate, the 
negative influence the Americans had on negotiations has passed with the end of 
the Cold War. It is now in American interests to see Japan and Russia resolve 
this Pacific dispute. 
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While both Japan and Russia could have framed a domain of gains 
and successfully arbitrated during the Cold War, this was not likely because of 
the strong American influence in—if not control of—Japanese affairs. Only since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union is the environment truly suited for successful 
arbitration. Figure 21 visually summarizes the territorial losses and gains of 
Japan and Russia, as well as their domains over the dispute period.   
 
Figure 21.   Kuril Islands dispute trend lines. 
2. Status Quo 
The Kuril Islands can no longer claim the strategic significance they had 
during the Cold War; they are significant now only in their symbolism.159  While 
Russia currently controls the entire chain de facto, it has a weak de jure claim, a 
result of failing to sign the Treaty of San Francisco. Japan, too, has a weak de 
jure claim on the larger islands of Iturup and Kunashir, as it fully renounced the 
Kurils in the same treaty. International law only supports the return of Habomai 
and Shikotan to Japan upon conclusion of a peace treaty, according to the 1956 
Joint Declaration. Otherwise, “it is not law but the outcome of diplomatic 
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negotiations between Russia and Japan that will determine the ultimate 
sovereignty of [the islands].”160 
For purposes of this thesis’s model, the dispute is stable, as discussed in 
Chapters II and III. Therefore, the status quo is cartographically scoped to the 
extent of Japan’s claim: Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and the Habomai.161  Russia 
controls all four islands, but will unequivocally return the latter two upon 
successful arbitration (defined as resulting in a peace treaty). Therefore, 
successful negotiations result in the transfer of at least two islands. Japan has 
the potential to receive two more islands (at most), fulfilling their claim. If Russia 
prefers to retain all four islands, arbitration cannot be successful, as the terms of 
the Joint Declaration must be met. However, for arbitration to be successful, the 
conflict cannot be looked at in such zero-sum terms as exchanging islands. As 
political scientist Graham Allison states, “Russia will not give up anything to 
anyone unilaterally—nor should it be expected to.”162  The dispute must be 
transformed into a positive sum game that advances Russian and Japanese 
interests in all dimensions.163 
Maintaining the dispute is costly for both sides. Although no longer 
formally at war, Russia and Japan are not formally at peace. This diplomatic 
limbo, while many times only symbolic, has impeded full partnership of many 
Russian-Japanese efforts. On critical issues, such as fishing,164 compromise has 
been made, although far from ideal.165  However, the two powers could be better 
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joined economically: Japan can benefit from Russia’s natural resources and 
Russia can benefit from Japan’s capital. Russia is also incurring costs re-
militarizing the islands, with two garrisons expected to be complete by 2014.166  
Russia has little incentive to reintroduce military forces to Kuril outposts other 
than the territorial dispute. 
C. RUSSIAN DECISION MAKING 
It is easy to see any movement on the territory dispute as a loss for the 
Russians. As a minimum, international law expects the exchange of two islands 
upon the competition of a peace treaty. This negative viewpoint is partially 
responsible for the strong statements from current Russian leadership. President 
Dmitry Medvedev visited the Kurils for a second time in July 2012, saying, “[The 
islands] are an important part of the Sakhalin region and an important part of the 
Russian land.”167  To successfully achieve formal peace, Russian leadership 
must not focus on the transfer of islands, but instead focus on the gains that can 
be made within the security, political, and economic dimensions. 
1. Framing 
Using principles of prospect theory, the conflict can be examined for 
default framing, then, if applicable, properly framed to enhance the success of 
arbitration. Recognizing the endowment effect, certainty effect, use of bargaining 
chips, accommodation to gains, and status quo bias will help Russia transition its 
default reference point to one where peace is viewed as a gain. 
Because Russia has controlled the Kurils for over almost seventy years, 
their sense of endowment is strong. Recalling that that the endowment effect 
causes possessions to be assigned a higher value then if they were not owned, 
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the default Russian frame views the Kurils as more valuable then they inherently 
are. To properly frame the Southern Kurils, Russian leaders must recognize the 
small, distant territory candidly: the islands have a severely depressed fishing 
economy with potential, but they no longer retain the vital geo-strategic interest 
they once had.168 
Knowing that a peace settlement requires the transfer of Shikotan and the 
Habomais, the certainty effect can cause the loss of these islands to also be 
overweighed (favoring risk-seeking behavior) in Russia’s default viewpoint. 
Instead, Russia should view these two small Southern Kuril Islands for what the 
Soviets intended them to be—bargaining chips. The 1956 Joint Declaration 
makes it clear that the Soviet Union sought to induce the Japanese into a peace 
agreement with the prospect of gaining Shikotan and Habomai. These islands 
must be viewed in the same vein during current negotiations. Not only does this 
framing remove the negative influence of the certainty effect, it also reduces the 
Russian endowment. 
Even if Shikotan and Habomai are viewed as bargaining chips, Russia has 
fully accommodated to the gain of Kunashir and Iturup over the past half century. 
Defending this accommodated gain can again induce risk-seeking behavior. This 
underpins the importance of viewing any transfer of islands not as a loss, but as 
an opportunity for gain. If Russia is expected to transfer the larger islands of 
Kunashir and Iturup, it must in return receive a “package that advances Russian 
interests in every dimension… enhancing their security, political standing and 
economic well-being.”169 
Russian leaders must also recognize the effect the status quo bias has on 
the default view of the conflict—an overweighed preference for the current state 
of affairs may cause a missed opportunity for a more valuable outcome. This, 
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combined with the previously mentioned factors, makes the best Russian 
reference point one that already incorporates the return of Shikotan and 
Habomai. This reference point prevents the transfer of these two islands from 
being viewed as a loss, but rather as bargaining chips to achieve gains. Now the 
negotiations can focus on the value of Kunashir and Iturup to both parties, as 
well as focus on how Russia can prevent future loss. More specifically, how 
Russia can secure international recognition of its sovereignty on Sakhalin and 
the rest of the Kuril chain. 
2. Domain 
The dispute over the Kurils is stable, as defined in Chapter II. Although 
saber rattling occurs over the years, Russia has generally displayed risk-averse 
behavior. While Russia’s default domain can be framed in terms of loss, there is 
potential Russia can maintain a domain of gains—particularly if dispute resolution 
focuses on net the gains identified by Allison, Kimura, and Sarkisov. Specifically,  
i) Guarantees that Russia will retain all present rights to fish, natural 
resources, and the 200-mile economic zone around the disputed 
islands. 
ii) Guarantees that Russia will retain all current rights to free and safe 
passage of ships through the straits between Iturup and Kunashir, 
and between Iturup and Urup. 
iii) Gains in territorial terms from international recognition of Russia’s 
sovereignty over southern Sakhalin and the eighteen non-disputed 
Kuril Islands. 
iv) Gains in national security from guarantees the disputed islands will 
be forever demilitarized, and a Russian role as a “cooperation 
partner” in the Japanese-American security treaty. 
v) Significant economic gains from Japanese payment for all costs of 
relocation, and long-term Japanese aid and investment in Russian 
Far East.170 
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Russian leaders can then ask the question: if such a package were 
available, would they prefer this comprehensive agreement to the current 
stalemate? 
D. JAPANESE DECISION MAKING 
The Japanese, too, can easily frame the dispute in terms of loss—
specifically, unrecovered loss. Previous to 1945, the Southern Kurils had always 
been Japanese; they were never part of the Russian controlled Kurils. For 
practical purposes, the Japanese have accommodated to the loss, but politically 
and emotionally, they have not.171  The Southern Kurils are called the “Northern 
Territories” in Japan, encapsulating their irredentist claim and sense of loss. 
1. Framing 
The Japanese view of the conflict is also examined for default framing, 
then, as applicable, framed alternatively to enhance the success of arbitration. 
Recognizing aspirations levels, accommodation to loss, and the isolation effect 
will help Japan transition its default reference point out of the domain of losses. 
Japan must be willing to provide Russia the gains it will require to 
reconceptualize the issue, and be “flexible on everything beyond the principle of 
sovereignty, including timing, modalities, and conditions.”172 
For the past six decades, the Japanese have desired the return of the four 
islands composing the Southern Kurils. This aspiration level makes Russian 
control of the disputed islands a loss for the Japanese.173  The Japanese do not 
view the Northern Territories as land taken from Japan due to their aggression in 
World War II, but rather as homeland stolen by the Soviets after the formal 
                                            
171 David Rees, “Soviet Border Problems: China and Japan,” Conflict Studies no 139 
(London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1982), 23. 
172 Allison, Kimura, and Sarkisov, Beyond Cold War to Trilateral Cooperation, xi. 
173 For an excellent explanation of Japan’s “Northern Territory Syndrome” and how it 
consumes Japan’s Russian policy, see, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, “Conclusion: Russo-Japanese 
Relations in the New Environment—Implications of Continuing Stalemate,” in Russia and Japan: 
An Unresolved Dilemma Between Distant Neighbors, eds. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Jonathan 
Haslam, and Andrew C. Kuchins (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1993), 423. 
 81
Japanese surrender.174  Maintaining this default aspiration level is popular for 
nationalistic Japanese political purposes, but its inflexibility over the decades has 
hampered peace progress since the 1956 Joint Declaration.175  Instead, the 
Japanese should shift their reference point so the return of the Russian 
controlled islands are a gain, which ultimately will provide the Japanese the best 
path to achieve their aspiration level. 
Closely tied to the Japanese aspirational level is the unaccommodated 
loss of the islands. Americans initially stoked this sentiment to suit Cold War 
politics, but nationalist Japanese politics keep the loss alive today. To move 
closer to successful arbitration, the Japanese must accept the Southern Kurils 
were lost during World War II, no matter the historical possession before that 
point; the Soviet Union defeated Japan and seized the territory as a spoil. From 
this reference point, return of the islands is a gain, not simply a recovered loss. 
Japan must also be cognizant of the isolation effect when framing a 
peaceful resolution with Russia. Japan should expect the return of Shikotan and 
Habomai upon a successful conclusion, but it cannot discount or ignore these 
gains simply because they are included in any successful resolution. Japanese 
leaders should emphasize the individual gain of the two islands and not relegate 
them as assumed concessions from the Russians.176  This, combined with the 
framing factors previously mentioned, make Japan’s best reference point the 
geographic status quo (but with accommodated losses). From here, any 
transition of territory is a gain, to include the “easy-wins” of Shikotan and 
Habomai. Just like the Russians, the Japanese can then focus negotiations on 
determining how much Kunashir and Iturup are “worth.” 
                                            
174 Morris, “The ‘Northern Territories’ Dispute,” 44–45. 
175 Jo Dee Catlin Jacob, “Introduction,” in Beyond the Hoppo Ryodo: Japanese-Soviet-
American Relations in the 1990s, ed. Jo Dee Catlin Jacob (Washington, DC: American Enterprise 
Institute Press, 1991), 3; and, Allison, Kimura, and Sarkisov, Beyond Cold War to Trilateral 
Cooperation, xi. 
176 Although this is nearly a diametric view from what the Russian must take, regarding the 
islands as bargaining chips. 
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2. Domain 
The dispute over the Kurils is stable on the Japanese side, like the 
Russian, and Japan has also displayed risk-adverse behavior. While Japanese 
politicians like to default frame the Kurils as a loss, Japan can maintain a domain 
of gains by focusing on resolution gains identified by Allison, Kimura, and 
Sarkisov. Among them,  
i) Start discussion of a program for improving the lives of the 
islanders in areas where Japan’s sovereignty is recognized during 
the transitional period. 
ii) Communicate unambiguously Japan’s readiness to become a lead 
donor in a long-term program for Russian development in the Far 
East. 
iii) Make clear Japan’s commitment to make the process of 
normalizing relations between the nations a positive-sum game in 
which Russia suffers no net loss, but rather the opposite: significant 
net gains in every important category, including security, politics 
and economics.177 
Japanese leaders can move past the emotional and symbolic rhetoric 
surrounding the Northern Territories and determine how valuable the islands are 
to regain. That is, how many gains is Japan willing to give Russia in order for 
Japan to receive its desired gains? 
E. ARBITRATION 
With both Japan and Russia in a domain of gains, the first hypothesis, 
applicability, postulates that arbitration will be more successful. This section will 
determine the acceptability and durability of the arbitrated results, which can 
determine the validity of the reaming two hypotheses. 
1. The Game 
As specified in Chapter III, setting up a game to model the Russian-
Japanese Kuril dispute will incorporate the domain of each, start with ordinal 
payoffs, and then assign cardinal values to better analyze strategic positions. 
                                            
177 Allison, Kimura, and Sarkisov, Beyond Cold War to Trilateral Cooperation, xi–xii. 
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While multiple columns and rows could model the many options available to 
Japan and Russia, for simplicity a two-by-two grid is used, simplifying the 
outcomes to the most likely courses of action. These outcomes include “Peace,” 
which implies a peace treaty with the transfer of Shikotan and Habomai, and 
“Peace + α,” with alpha being the additional considerations of Kunashir and 
Iturup, as well as the specifics of compensation, timing, modalities, etc.178  This 
creates the game in Figure 22: 
 
Figure 22.   Kuril Islands dispute with ordinal payoffs. 
In this game, Japan desires all four islands and achieves its best outcome 
if Russia accepts its offer (+ α). Russia’s best outcome is achieving peace with 
Japan, but not having to transfer more islands than necessary. The worst 
outcome for both occurs when their strategies do not align at Peace + α/Peace. 
This result can be described as the Russian asking price α as being “too high.”  
That is, the Russians have little interest in transferring additional islands, and the 
Japanese are not willing to pay an inflated price. Similarly, Peace/Peace + α, can 
be described as the Japanese offer α being “too low”—the Russians are willing to 
negotiate on the additional islands, but the Japanese offer α falls short of 
providing Russia sufficient gains. The stable status quo is assigned a payoff of 
(0,0) and would remain the outcome if negotiations break down; threats or 
security positions are not relevant to this dispute.179 
                                            
178 ‘Peace + α’ is adapted from Allison, Kimura, and Sarkisov’s proposed formula of “2 + 
alpha.”  Allison, Kimura, and Sarkisov, Beyond Cold War to Trilateral Cooperation, xiii. 
179 With play of the game, each country does have a viable threat, however its use is 
unreasonable in this case, as the payoff would be above zero.  A more credible threat would be 
walking out of arbitration and a return to the status quo, with a payoff of zero. 
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2. Strategic Positions 
The Kuril Island game creates the movement diagram in Figure 23: 
 
Figure 23.   Kuril Islands dispute movement diagram. 
Game play is analyzed without communication or cooperation in order to 
determine each player’s strategic strengths or weaknesses. Russia has a 
dominant strategy to negotiate the value of α, but Japan does not have a 
dominant strategy. There is one strong equilibrium at Peace + α/Peace + α. This 
position is easy for Russia, as it only must be willing to listen to Japan’s offer. 
Getting here is harder for the Japanese, however. They must find the domestic 
resolve and support to produce gains for Russia, making α as valuable as 
possible. If both countries play conservatively (their maximin strategy), they 
resolve at Peace/Peace + α, the second worse outcome for Japan, but Russia’s 
best.180   
Within the game, Japan has a strong strategic position regarding first 
moves. They receive their best outcome at Peace + α/Peace + α, regardless of 
who moves first. This is a result of Russia’s dominant strategy to always play 
Peace + α. What it lacks in a first move, however, Russia gains with a threat. 
This requires one-time, one-way communication (e.g., “Focusing only on α, will 
cause us to walk away.”)181  Allowing first moves gets Japan its best payoff and 
                                            
180 Another benefit of Russia’s dominant strategy. 
181 While strategic moves based upon the payoffs prove the validity of Russia’s threat, it 
does not seem credible when put in context, as Russia’s dominant strategy is to negotiate on α.  
Interestingly, this threat seems to mirror Yeltsin’s aborted visits to Japan in the early 1990s, see 
Allison, Kimura, and Sarkisov, Beyond Cold War to Trilateral Cooperation, ix. 
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Russia its second best payoff.182  While this result is better for Japan than 
playing conservatively, it is not for Russia. Russia gets its best payoff from both 
nations playing conservatively with a maximin solution at Peace/Peace + α. First 
moves, therefore, can be unfair in Russian eyes. In the end, arbitration can 
produce better results than non-communication or conservative play, as well as 
find a result that both countries find fair, increasing the likelihood of a durable 
solution. 
To accomplish this, the ordinal scale game is transformed to an interval 
scale with cardinal payoffs. This produces the game in Figure 24. 
 
Figure 24.   Kuril Islands dispute with cardinal payoffs. 
Every Japanese payoff is positive (better than the status quo) because, as 
a minimum, they are receiving a gain of Shikotan and Habomai. Their lowest 
payoff at Peace + α/Peace is only a 1 because irredentist claims will likely 
continue—Japan wants to provide Russia with α, but Russia is unwilling to accept 
it at any price. Despite a gain of the two small islands, this outcome still leaves 
Japan unsatisfied. Japan’s second worse outcome, Peace/Peace + α, also has a 
low payoff. In this case, the Japanese could negotiate their full claim, but fail 
because domestic politics prevent the level of support required to satisfy Russia. 
Japan’s second highest payoff of 5 still falls short of their goal. At 
Peace/Peace, the lack of domestic Japanese support for a comprehensive 
package is at least tempered by a lack of Russian willingness to negotiate on α. 
However, at Peace + α/Peace + α, Japanese aspirations are finally met. They 
                                            
182 Assuming they know each other’s payoffs. 
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have the domestic resolve to support a comprehensive package, and Russia is 
willing to accept. The Northern Territories are again Japanese, and the Russians 
are satisfied with their gains. 
For the Russians, one outcome of arbitration is much worse than the 
status quo: Peace + α/Peace, with a payoff of -7. In this case, Japanese 
irredentist claims survive, as mentioned above, while Russia transfers territory 
and loses its bargaining chips of Shikotan and Habomai. While there is a formal 
peace treaty, there is hardly resolution to the Kuril Islands dispute and Russia 
gives up much strategic ground. 
Russia’s second worse outcome, however, is significantly better. At 
Peace/Peace, Russia still maintains the two large islands in the Southern Kurils, 
holds a signed peace treaty, and their strategy mirrored that of the Japanese. 
The outcome is uncontestable, although it may not be the most durable—future 
domestic Japanese politics may transition to a Peace + α viewpoint, and 
irredentist claims may again rise. 
Russia’s next best outcome is just slightly better with a payoff of 8 at 
Peace + α/Peace + α. At this junction, the dispute is fully resolved. Japan has its 
claim satisfied and Russia has internationally recognized claims on the 
remainder of the Kurils, plus Sakhalin. Russia also receives gains in political and 
economic dimensions. The only shortfall of this solution is the transfer Kunashir 
and Iturup. 
 Russia achieves its best outcome at Peace/Peace + α. Russia has a 
peace treaty, plus internationally recognized claims on the Kurils (to include 
Kunashir and Iturup) and Sakhalin. In addition, Russia does everything it can to 
resolve the territorial dispute. The international community recognizes Russian 
attempts to satisfy the Japanese, while the Japanese are viewed as inflexible 
with failed leadership. International support for any future Japanese claims on the 
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Kurils will decline and Russia can return to the previously indefensible position of 
“There is no territorial dispute with Japan. The Kuril islands are our territory.”183 
3. Cooperative Solution 
Knowing that communication and cooperation in the game will produce the 
best results for both countries, Japan and Russia can apply Nash’s axiomatic 
approach to determine a fair outcome to implement, resolving their dispute over 
the Kuril Islands.   
a. Graphical Nash Solution 
The possible outcomes to the dispute are graphically represented 
by constructing a payoff polygon (Figure 25). 
 
Figure 25.   Kuril Islands dispute payoff polygon. 
                                            
183 “Japan Won’t Get Kuril Islands—Mironov,” Russia Today, January 31, 2012, 
http://rt.com/politics/mironov-presidential-program-elections-139. 
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The Pareto-optimal line in the first quadrant (i.e., greater than the 
status quo), bounded by the possible payoffs, defines the negotiation set (Figure 
26). It can be seen that a triangle defined by the status quo at one corner and the 
Pareto-optimal as the hypotenuse will produce a graphical solution outside the 
negotiation set. That is, the graphical solution is “below and to the right” of (10,8). 
Therefore, sliding this “fair” point back along the Pareto-optimal line into the 
negotiation set produces the solution point N at (10,8).  
 
Figure 26.   Kuril Islands dispute negotiation set and solution N. 
b. Algebraic Nash Solution 
The Nash point is algebraically computed using Equation (4) and 
substituting (0,0) for the status quo (Xo,Yo). Both a (height of Nash triangle) and m 
(slope of Pareto-optimal line) must be determined before the equation can be 
completed.   
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The equation for the Pareto optimal line from (2,10) to (10,8) is  
y = mx + b, where b is the y-intercept. Then, 
m = (Y2–Y1)/(X2–X1) = (8–10)/(10–2) = -0.25 
Then, 
b = Y1–mX1 = 10 – -0.25(2) = 10.5 
 
Therefore, the Pareto optimal line is: 
 
y = -0.25x + 10.5 
 
With a (equal to b since Yo = 0) and m determined, substitution into 
Equation (4) maximizes (X – X0)(Y – Y0): 
 
XMax = Xo + a/(2|m|) = 0 + 10.5/[2(0.25)] = 21.00 
YMax = Yo + a/2 = 0 + 10.5/2 = 5.25 
 
Therefore, 
Max = (21, 5.25) 
 
The maximum occurs at X = 21, which is beyond the negotiation set 
bounded by (10,8). Hence, the maximum of the negotiation set on the X-axis 
becomes the Nash solution point.   
Therefore, 
N = (10,8) 
 
c. Resolution 
Japan obviously sees this solution as fair—they receive their best 
payoff. Russia, too, sees the solution as fair. It follows their dominant strategy, 
and although it does not provide them with their maximum payoff, the payoff 
value of 8 is significantly higher than the status quo (0), and well above their 
worst-case scenario (-7).   
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Geographic implementation of this solution is straightforward. 
Because the result is a pure strategy solution, no mixed-strategy calculations are 
required. Because N = (10,8) = Peace + α/Peace + α, Japan receives all four 
disputed islands of the South Kurils. Russia receives recognized sovereignty 
over Sakhalin and the remaining Kurils, plus diplomatic, economic, and political, 
gains. Negotiations determine the value of α. For example, how much will Japan 
invest in the Russian Far East, how long before Russian recognition of Japanese 
residual sovereignty over the Southern Kurils becomes implemented, and how is 
Russia integrated into Japanese security treaties? 
4. Durability 
Finding a Nash solution to the Kuril dispute at different points in time 
allows comparison between the geographic implementations of the solutions. 
This aids in determining the durability of current solution; the more the present 
solution is similar to previous solutions, the more durable it is. 
This requires identifying key periods in the conflict and creating games to 
reflect the strategic positions. For simplicity, time periods previously defined in 
the dispute background will be used, specifically: 1855, 1875, 1905, 1945, 1951, 
and 1956. The games will be constructed with Seize/Don’t Seize as strategy 
options, since Peace/Peace + α does not translate to all previous periods.184 
Because the payoffs for the present game are in relation to the current 
status quo, previous games must also use a similar datum in order to be 
generally compared. To accomplish this, previous period payoffs are initially 
assigned with a corresponding status quo of (0,0). From here, the period status 
quo is compared to the present status quo, and values linearly changed, as 
appropriate. For example, the 1855 status quo has Japan in control of the 
Sothern Kurils. This is initially valued (0,0). Because the 1855 status quo equals 
a value of (10,8) in the present game, the 1855 payoffs are linearly adjusted by 
                                            
184 Scoping the present game to only the four islands in the current dispute admittedly 
weakens this analysis.  Ideally, the durability games would include all the Kurils (and perhaps 
Sakhalin) to allow even comparison.  For brevity and simplicity, however, this fault is accepted.  
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(10,8). This is an attempt to normalize datums for payoff comparisons.185  Each 
periodic solution N has a corresponding geographic implementation with either 
pure or mixed strategies. The geographic implementations for each period are 
then compared to determine durability (see Figure 33 at the end of this section). 
a. 1855 
Japan and Russia have ratified the Shimoda Treaty as relatively 
equal, if not unknown, powers. While on an absolute scale Russia may be 
stronger, regionally it is not. The Empire is distracted by the Crimean War and 
treats an unknown Japan conservatively. As a result of the treaty, Japan controls 
Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir, and Iturup, while Russia controls the remainder of 
the Kurils to the north. Sakhalin is ambiguously split north and south. The game 
in Figure 27 represents the strategic positions. The status quo is Japanese 
control of the Southern Kurils and half of Sakhalin, valued at (10,8). 
 
Figure 27.   Kuril dispute in 1855. 
The arbitrated Nash solution for the game is N = (10,8), a pure 
strategy solution of Don’t Seize for each country; the status quo remains. 
b. 1875 
By 1875, the Japanese position has weakened. Russia has 
advanced into traditionally Japanese areas of Sakhalin and is asserting itself in 
                                            
185 This analysis is also weakened by the structure of the present day game, which is 
constructed to focus on the present solution, not to analyze previous periods.  Future work should 
take a more holistic approach to durability analysis by not baselining it with a game optimized for 
the present, but rather use games created with identical structures.  While this would provide a 
better durability analysis, it is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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the sea-lanes. The Japanese shogunate has been replaced, and the Meiji 
government is establishing itself. Japan and Russia negotiate the Treaty of St. 
Petersburg, with Japan conceding claims on Sakhalin in exchange for all of the 
Kurils. This is largely a measure to protect the home island of Hokkaido from 
Russian aggression. The game in Figure 28 represents the strategic positions. 
The status quo is Japanese control of the entire Kurils (but none of Sakhalin), 
valued at (15,11). 
 
Figure 28.   Kuril dispute in 1875. 
The arbitrated Nash solution for the game is N = (17,3), a mixed 
strategy solution with Japan 50 percent Seize; Russia 50 percent Seize. 
Geographically, Japan and Russia would divide the value of the Kurils evenly, a 
point that would likely fall between Iturup an Urup, the dividing line of the 
Southern Kurils. 
c. 1905 
Japan soundly defeats Russia in the Russo-Japanese war. The 
Portsmouth Treaty concludes the war with Japan claiming all of Sakhalin and still 
maintaining control of the Kurils. The Japanese victory is a surprise to Western 
observers, and highlights Japan’s rising power and colonial desires. The game in 
Figure 29 represents the strategic positions. The status quo is Japanese control 
of the entire Kurils (and all of Sakhalin), valued at (15,9). 
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Figure 29.   Kuril dispute in 1905. 
The arbitrated Nash solution for the game is N = (16.25,10), a 
mixed strategy solution with Japan 56.25 percent Seize; Russia 43.75 percent 
Seize. Geographically, Japan and Russia would divide the value of the Kurils 
marginally in favor of Japan, a point that would likely fall in Boussole Strait, north 
of Urup. 
d. 1945 
Japan has been soundly defeated in World War II and the Soviet 
Union seizes all the Kurils and Sakhalin. Japan is powerless to stop them. The 
game in Figure 30 represents the strategic positions. The status quo is Russian 
control of the entire Kurils (and all of Sakhalin), valued at (0,0). 
 
Figure 30.   Kuril dispute in 1945. 
The arbitrated Nash solution for the game is N = (2,3.3), a mixed 
strategy solution with Japan 33.3 percent Seize; Russia 66.6 percent Seize. 
Geographically, Japan and Russia would divide the value of the Kurils in favor of 
Russia, a point that would likely fall between Iturup and Kunashir. 
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e. 1951 
While Japan is recovering from World War II, it is diplomatically 
weak and must acquiesce to American prerogatives. The United States uses the 
Treaty of San Francisco to formalize peace with Japan as much to isolate the 
Soviet Union. Despite Japanese reservations, the Kuril conflict is intentionally left 
unsettled to suit American Cold-War politics. The game in Figure 31 represents 
the strategic positions. The status quo is Russian control of the entire Kurils (and 
all of Sakhalin), valued at (0,0). 
 
Figure 31.   Kuril dispute in 1951. 
The arbitrated Nash solution for the game is N = (2,3.3). Although 
this is coincidentally the same value as in 1945, the strategy solutions are 
different, primarily due to the change in domains. Japan plays 33.3 percent 
Seize; Russia has a pure strategy solution of Seize. Geographically, the value of 
the Kurils is divided significantly in favor of Russia; Japan would likely receive 
only Shikotan and Habomai. 
f. 1956 
Japan and Russia acknowledge the untenable position of their 
diplomatic affairs. While the Joint Declaration ends the state of war, a peace 
treaty is not signed. Japan is willing to negotiate on the Kurils in an attempt to 
conclude the dispute, but American intervention causes the conflict to continue. 
The game in Figure 32 represents the strategic positions. The status quo is 
Russian control of the entire Kurils (and all of Sakhalin), valued at (0,0). 
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Figure 32.   Kuril dispute in 1956. 
The arbitrated Nash solution for the game is N = (2.25,4.09). 
Russia again plays a pure solution of Seize; Japan plays 29.55 percent Seize. 
Geographically, the value of the Kurils is again divided significantly in favor of 
Russia; Japan would likely receive only Shikotan and Habomai. 
g.  Analysis of Durability 
The present day solution of Japanese control of the Southern Kurils 
appears durable. Geographically, it falls within the bounds of the theoretically 
previous arbitration results (Figure 33). However, it is a step away from the 
relatively recent arbitrated borders of 1951 and 1956, which clearly favored the 
Soviets. This is likely due to the factor of the side payment (α) in the present 
solution. Among the previously mentioned faults with this durability analysis is 
only the present solution accounts for side payments to influence framing. If side 
payments are stripped from the current game, the Japanese will control only 
Shikotan and Habomai (per the 1956 Joint Declaration), which mirrors the 1951 
and 1956 solutions, as well as being close to the 1945 result. Again, signs the 
present-day solution is durable. 
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Figure 33.   Geographic implementation of hypothetical Nash arbitration results.186
                                            
186 Map by author.  Maps optimized for black and white printing are in Appendix B. 
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F. CASE STUDY SUMMARY 
This chapter touched on some of the key periods in the Kuril Island 
dispute between Japan and Russia. Becasue the islands changed hands multiple 
times, it is difficult to objectively determine “who” should justifiably receive “what.”  
It is clear, however, that both sides have wrapped the dispute with emotions in 
order to pander to domestic politics. While the Kuril Islands no longer have the 
geo-strategic importance they had during the Cold War, they are important in 
terms of exclusive economic zones. 
To resolve the dispute, both Russia and Japan should modify their default 
framing in order to ensure a domain of gains, enhancing the chance for 
successful arbitration. With the proposed game, Nash arbitration would result in 
Japanese sovereignty of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, and Habomai. Russia would 
receive recognized sovereignty over Sakhalin and the remaining Kurils, plus 
substantial gains in diplomatic, economic and security realms. This arbitrated 
solution appears durable, as it aligns closely with theoretically arbitrated results 
at prior periods in the dispute.   
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Territorial disputes often involve more than just a line on a map. 
Nationalism, resources, ethnicity, or other emotive causes fuel their complexity, 
and these are often found in combination. The enmity between factions creates 
difficult circumstances for the states to bi-laterally resolve their conflict, other than 
by open conflict. Arbitration, however, provides a non-violent means to resolve 
the dispute, and this thesis attempts to outline a process that produces 
applicable, acceptable, and durable results to territorial disputes. 
Analyzing disputes with prospect theory shows that understanding and 
then constructing a proper frame for the conflict is paramount. If a state’s default 
framing of a conflict is understood, then functions of prospect theory can be 
utilized to propose an alternate framing, which ideally would lead to a domain of 
gains. When states (or more specifically, their leaders) are in a domain of gains, 
territorial disputes are most arbitrable. This “gains frame” produces risk-adverse 
decision making, where a state is willing to concede on some grounds in order to 
prevent a larger loss on others. Determining the applicability of arbitration is only 
part the solution, however. Operationalizing an arbitration scheme and 
geographically implementing the result must also be completed. 
  Nash arbitration provides a constructive method for determining a fair 
and acceptable solution. In order to operationalize a Nash scheme, a non-zero-
sum game is constructed that incorporates all the complexities of the dispute. 
Granted, the game reduces the dispute into a simple model, but it can provide a 
useful arbitration guideline if its payoffs are generated by thorough analysis of the 
conflict. From the payoffs and resulting solution N, geographic implementation is 
possible. Just as determining payoffs must be a comprehensive and educated 
process, so must be the drawing of new lines on a map. Geographically 
implementing a durable N is a process that must be informed by all the 
complexities that created the dispute. To disregard one will lead to a less durable 
solution. 
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Of course, this process is not a sure-fire method to resolve all territorial 
disputes. Statecraft and diplomacy will undoubtedly require larger roles than just 
properly framing a conflict. However, an acceptable and durable Nash solution 
provides a well-informed and accountable starting point for the process. As 
shown, it also provides a geographically implementable solution, as the 
conclusion of any territorial dispute will require some cartographic element. 
Through case studies and modeling, this thesis has attempted to test the 
following hypotheses: 
H1) Territorial disputes are most arbitrable when both states are in a 
domain of gains. 
H2) If both states are in a domain of gains, the acceptability of Nash 
arbitration in territorial disputes increases. 
H3) Nash arbitration is most durable when dynamic dispute conditions 
generate fewer aberrations to results over time. 
 
The results of these tests lead to implications for territorial dispute 
arbitration. First, framing the dispute is critical—both the overall context of the 
conflict, as well as the negotiation set utilized to resolve it. Before an outlined 
settlement can be agreed to, both parties need to be placed in a domain of gains. 
This will revolve around framing the conflict in such a way that history does not 
provide undue influence. Specifically, the prevention of future loss should be the 
focus, rather than the accounting of past losses. A failure in framing caused 
Russian President Yeltsin to cancel his visits to Japan in the early 1990s, nipping 
in the bud the Kuril Islands dispute’s best chance at resolution in forty years.187 
With the context properly framed, the emphasis transitions to maintaining a 
domain of gains when dealing with negotiation set variables such as timing, 
modalities, and bargaining chips.  
Second, arbitration must leverage the risk aversion of gains-frame parties 
by highlighting the costs (losses) associated with failure (e.g., loss of aid, 
                                            
187 The context surrounding the talks was ‘how many islands will Russia return?’ which did 
not place the Russians in a domain of gains. 
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sanctions, etc.)  These serious risks should provide the incentive for negotiation-
set choices to appear more appealing than the option of failure. In the Kuril 
dispute, both Japan and Russia have been able to fall back to a tenable status 
quo, forestalling resolution. Arbitration can stress “losing all” is a real result of 
failure (e.g., Japan will no longer have an internationally recognized claim on any 
islands). This implication is obviously closely tied to maintaining a domain of 
gains throughout the negotiation.   
Finally, to be successful, arbitration must be able to provide suitable 
proposed gains. It is here that Nash’s scheme is beneficial. This thesis has 
shown that Nash arbitration results can be geographically implemented, and the 
method is also flexible enough to incorporate non-cartographic factors such as 
side payments (e.g., fishing rights, resource access, etc.)  Nash’s scheme, as 
demonstrated by this thesis’s model, provides fair results to both parties that are 
not only applicable and acceptable, but they can be tested for durability as well. 
Territorial conflicts predate the modern nation-state concept of defined 
borders, and will continue even when humanity moves on to other notions of 
sovereignty. These disputes will continue to challenge peace and prosperity, 
soldiers and statesmen, and thinkers and theories. This thesis hopes to add to 
the discussion in order to arrive at the ideal: a non-violent approach to resolving 
territorial disputes. 
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APPENDIX A–HALA’IB TRIANGLE CASE STUDY VIGNETTE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The “Hala’ib triangle” is a nearly 8,000-square-mile wedge of land along 
the Red Sea between the borders of Egypt and Sudan (Figure 34). The land is 
predominantly rocky and sandy, and has little inherent value at the surface. Oil 
and gas reserves, however, are likely offshore in the Red Sea.188 
The triangle was created as a result of the misalignment of two boundaries 
drawn by the British at the turn of the last century. The first boundary, referred to 
as the “political boundary,” was drawn in 1899 and delineated the border of Egypt 
and Sudan as the 22nd parallel. Three years later, in 1902, an “administrative 
boundary” was created that eased the implementation of the linear political 
border. Three areas were marked for transfer of administrative control because 
tribal grazing lands or railroads did not align with the political border. This later 
boundary granted the largest area, consisting of the Ababda tribal lands in the 
Hala’ib triangle, to Sudan, as its inhabitants were geographically and tribally 
closer to Khartoum.189  Also created by the administrative boundary are the 800-
square-mile quadrangle of Bir Tawil, and the 80-square-mile Wadi Halfa 
salient.190 
                                            
188 Rongxing Guo, Territorial Disputes and Resource Management: A Global Handbook 
(New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2007), 132–133. 
189 Daniel J. Dzurek, “Parting the Red Sea: Boundaries, Offshore Resources and Transit,” 
Durham University International Boundaries Research Unit, Maritime Briefing 3 no. 2 (2001): 4. 
190 Bir Tawil is south of the 22nd parallel and adjacent to, but inland from, the Hala’ib 
triangle.  Egypt was granted administrative control of the Beja tribal lands in this area, however, 
neither Egypt nor Sudan claim it, making it one of the few terra nullius areas on Earth.  The Wadi 
Halfa salient is a finger of Sudan reaching north into Egypt along the Nile River.  The salient ends 
where the navigable Nile once ended.  This location was a transfer point for goods bound for 
Khartoum by rail, so the British granted Sudan control of the area for commercial ease.  Lake 
Nasser, created by the Aswan dam, has flooded nearly the entire salient, making control of the 
area a negligible issue. 
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Figure 34.   Sudan-Egypt border area.191 
B. DISPUTE HISTORY 
After Sudan’s independence in 1956, Egypt claimed the 1899 political 
boundary (the 22nd parallel) as the border, while Sudan claimed the revised 
1902 administrative boundary as the mutual border. Thus, both Egypt and Sudan 
claim the Hala’ib triangle and Wadi Halfa salient, and renounce Bir Tawil (as 
claiming the quadrangle would void their other claims).    
Sudan has protested the presence of Egyptian troops in the Hala’ib 
triangle to international bodies numerous times, but joint control was essentially 
executed from the time Sudan gained independence. Tensions rose and fell 
during the decades, but they spiked in 1989 when Sudanese President Al-Bashir 
came to power after a coup. Sudan then granted a Canadian oil company 
exploration rights in the triangle in 1991, but the company withdrew until 
sovereignty issues were resolved. Through the 1990s, Sudan sought arbitration 
and referral of the dispute to the International Court of Justice for resolution. 
Egypt, however, has refused anything but bi-lateral discussions. 
                                            
191 Map by author.  Maps optimized for black and white printing are in Appendix B. 
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In December 1999, Egypt and Sudan agreed to resolve the dispute “in an 
integrational brotherly context that would form a lead in the process of full 
integration between the two countries.”192  Sudan unilaterally removed its forces 
in January 2000, effectively ceding the Hala’ib triangle to Egypt. Sudan reiterated 
its sovereignty of the area in 2004, but it remains under de facto Egyptian control. 
C. THE GAME 
Sudan and Egypt have an ancient and intertwined history. Egypt has been 
the dominant player during most, if not all, of that history. This explains Egyptian 
moves to control the Hala’ib triangle de facto, and hesitance to accept 
international resolution or arbitration; Egyptian leaders believe they control a 
stronger strategic position than Sudan in the dispute. Sudanese leaders seem to 
acknowledge their weakness regarding the Egyptians, but also recognize that 
they have a strong de jure claim on the Hala’ib triangle. This explains their 
willingness to submit the case to international action, including arbitration. This 
creates the game in Figure 35, with a status quo of Egypt playing Seize, Sudan 
playing Don’t Seize, and a payoff of (0,10). 
 
Figure 35.   Sudan-Egypt game (losses). 
Without applying any framing techniques, Egypt understandably views any 
transfer of the Hala’ib triangle to Sudan as a loss. This makes successful 
arbitration unlikely, as evidenced by the history of the dispute over the past half-
century. However, utilizing the principles of prospect theory, a solution can be 
presented to Egyptian leaders that emphasize the gains of resolution, as well as 
                                            
192 Dzurek, “Parting the Red Sea,” 6. 
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the prevention of great loss. This can place Egyptian decision makers in a 
domain of gains, increasing the chances of successful arbitration results. Some 
possible gains for Egypt include: 
i) Recognized sovereignty over the Wadi Halfa salient and Bir Tawil 
ii) Recognized sovereignty over portions of the Hala’ib triangle 
iii) Development of offshore oil and gas fields because sovereignty issues 
are resolved 
iv) Conclusion of a lingering dispute with an otherwise strong partner 
nation, strengthening Egypt’s position in the region 
 
If Egypt is placed in a domain of gains, it creates the game in Figure 36, 
with a status quo of Egypt playing Seize, Sudan playing Don’t Seize, and a 
payoff of (0,8). 
 
Figure 36.   Sudan-Egypt game (gains). 
In a domain of gains, Egyptian leaders realize the status quo is not their 
best payoff. A more valuable result can be achieved if Egypt has internationally 
recognized sovereignty within the Hala’ib triangle. Bargaining away a bit of the 
triangle in order to prevent any future loss of the territory would highlight Egyptian 
risk-aversion. 
D. ARBITRATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 
The game in Figure 35 (Egypt in a domain of losses) solves at N = (0,10), 
the status quo. With Egypt in a domain of gains, Figure 36 solves at N = (10,10), 
each country’s best payoff. Payoff polygons and graphical solutions are 
represented in Figure 37. 
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Figure 37.   Payoff polygons and Nash solutions for Sudan-Egypt games. 
When Egypt is in a domain of losses, there is no negotiation set, as it is 
impossible to improve Sudan’s position without degrading Egypt’s. Thus, the 
status quo at (0,10) is the Nash solution. History backs up the strength of this 
position. However, if Egypt can frame the border dispute in alternative ways, the 
domain of gains provides the best payoff for each country. The Nash solution 
moves to (10,10), as each country is able to fully develop their recognized 
sovereign land. Once Egypt sees the dispute not as just ceding land away, but 
the opportunity to achieve recognized sovereignty of the land, both countries 
benefit immensely. 
This case provides an illustrative example for geographic implementation 
not seen in the Kuril Islands case. Because of the profile of the payoff polygons, 
the value of N is rather simple to determine graphically in both games. In the first 
game (Figure 35), there are no negotiation points above the status quo for either 
player; there is no negotiation set (i.e., it is empty). In the second game (Figure 
36), it can be seen that as long as the value of Don’t Seize is greater than 0 for 
Sudan and greater than 8 for Egypt, then each country’s pure-strategy solution of 
Don’t Seize provides one, and only one, Pareto optimal solution. In the Kuril 
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Islands case study, the ratio of mixed strategy solutions determined the 
geographic implementation of arbitration. In this case, however, that method will 
not work, as it does not reflect the strategic strengths of each player. Both Sudan 
and Egypt have a pure strategy of Don’t Seize. This implies their best course of 
action is to submit to arbitration, but it does not provide the arbitrator any 
indication of one country’s relative strength in the game over the other, or how 
the territory should be divided. Simply splitting the land evenly ignores Egypt’s 
stronger position. 
In dual Don’t Seize strategy solutions such as this, each country’s relative 
gains from arbitration must be compared in order to geographically implement 
the results. In Figure 36, Egypt moves from a payoff of 8 to 10 as a result of 
arbitration; Sudan moves from 0 to 10. Egypt’s 2-unit move within a range of 20 
units (-10 to 10) provides a relative increase of 10 percent. Sudan’s 10-unit move 
with a range of 20 units provides an increase of 50 percent. The strength of each 
country’s position is now evident by comparing their relative increase in gains; 
Sudan’s perceived gains from arbitration are relatively five times greater than 
Egypt’s. Thus, Sudan has much more to gain from arbitration than Egypt, which 
reflects Egypt’s stronger strategic position in the game.193  Translating these 
relative gains into fair divisions, Sudan receives 1/6th the value of the Hala’ib 
triangle, Egypt receives 5/6ths of the value—or 5 times Sudan’s gain.194 
While the tribal inhabitants value the Hala’ib for its grazing (however 
meager), Egypt and Sudan both value the triangle for its 120 miles of Red Sea 
                                            
193 This method is based on the unpublished work of Frank Giordano and Gordon H. 
McCormick. 
194 Also, Bir Tawil and the Wadi Halfa salient should transfer to Egypt.  Bir Tawil is valueless 
to Sudan, and the reasoning behind granting its administration to Egypt with the 1902 
administrative boundary likely remains sound.  Likewise, the Wadi Halfa salient is now useless to 
Sudan economically, and it is more appropriate for Egypt to administer north of the 22nd parallel 
at the upper (southern) reaches of Lake Nasser. 
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shoreline and the associated offshore resources. Even the namesake port town 
of Hala’ib is of marginal value compared to the potential natural resources.195  
Division of the Hala’ib triangle along the Wadi Shellal to the Red Sea, just 
south of the town of Hala’ib, will evenly distribute the wealth of the territory to 
both Egypt and Sudan (Figure 38).196  This grants Egypt 100 miles of coastline, 
Sudan 20 miles. Presenting Egypt significantly more territory of the triangle 
reflects its strength in the dispute (and can reinforce its gains frame), and Sudan 
is equally satisfied with its gains, given its poor strategic position within the status 
quo. 
 
Figure 38.   Sudan-Egypt border resolution.197 
                                            
195 Egypt recently became a net importer of oil as domestic production has slumped.  Sudan 
is heavily dependent on oil exports, and its firm relationship with China in this field could develop 
any Red Sea fields. 
196 Assuming offshore resources are evenly distributed.  Actual exploration could improve 
delineation. 
197 Map by author.  Maps optimized for black and white printing are in Appendix B. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
The Hala’ib triangle vignette provides games and arbitration results 
complementary to the main Kuril Islands case study. Specifically, the Hala’ib 
dispute has conditions in which there is no negotiation set, as well as conditions 
that create a pure (Don’t Seize) strategy solution for both states. The combined 
Kuril and Hala’ib case studies therefore cover all three possible Nash solution 
scenarios: 1) empty, 2) single point, and 3) mixed solution. This tests the model 
by applying it to the full range of possibilities, from modifying domains in the first 
scenario, to geographically determining borders in the second and third 
scenarios. 
In the first scenario, when there is no negotiation set, prospect theory 
principles should be applied to ensure both belligerents are in a domain of gains. 
This increases the likelihood of successful arbitration by adjusting the payoffs 
each belligerent assigns to their strategies (due to the reflection effect), and can 
create a negotiation set when one previously did not exist. 
In the second scenario, when both countries have a pure Don’t Seize 
strategy solution, the arbitrator must factor in each nation’s strategic strength 
within the game to determine border delineation. This is not inherent in a Don’t 
Seize/Don’t Seize Nash solution, as it is within mixed strategy solutions. In this 
instance, geographic implementation must be determined by comparing each 
country’s relative gains from arbitration, and then awarding territory accordingly. 
Nash’s scheme still determines the fair point, and the arbitrator has quantitative 
values to determine the best border.   
Finally, when the scenario has a mixed strategy solution, geographic 
implementation is determined as shown in Chapter IV, where the ratio of 
strategies determines the delineation of the border.   
All three scenarios involve the principles of prospect theory, which 
ultimately determines that arbitration is initially not applicable to the first game 
(evidenced by the empty Nash solution). Prospect theory allows the empty 
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solution game to be reframed, and ultimately creates a negotiation set, opening 
the door for resolution. The second and third scenarios highlight how Nash 
arbitration can provide an acceptable and durable solution to territorial disputes. 
While they have different methods for geographic implementation, they are still 
based on Nash’s axiomatic approach. That is, they provide a solution that is both 
Pareto optimal and at or above the status quo (or security level) for each party, 
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APPENDIX B–ADDITIONAL MAPS 
The following maps have been optimized for black and white printing. 
They are more legible than the full-color maps found within the thesis chapters if 
printed on a grayscale printer. 
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Figure 39.   Kuril Island chain, grayscale.198 
                                            
198 Map by author. 
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Figure 40.   Geographic implementation of hypothetical Nash arbitration results, grayscale.199 
                                            
199 Map by author. 
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Figure 41.   Sudan-Egypt border area, grayscale.200 
 
Figure 42.   Sudan-Egypt border resolution, grayscale.201 
                                            
200 Map by author. 
201 Map by author. 
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